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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Two primary objectives of President Trump’s administration 
are expanded religious freedom and strict immigration 
enforcement. But many religiously motivated people are trying to 
help vulnerable undocumented people with necessities. Is that a 
crime?1 As executive officials continue to aggressively prosecute 
immigration laws2 and at the same time promote a robust 
understanding of religious freedom,3 a conflict is imminent 
between a broad interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act’s (INA) § 1324 prohibition against harboring undocumented 
people4 and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).5 As the 
Washington Post recently noted, the executive branch will be forced 
to decide “what it prioritizes more: its ability to deport immigrants 
in the country illegally—or the right of religious Americans to 
stand in their way.”6 If executive officials decide to exercise their 
discretion for a strict interpretation of the INA’s § 1324, courts will 
be forced to address the conflict as well. This Article proposes 
resolving the conflict by applying RFRA as a tool of statutory 
construction, rather than on a case-by-case basis. 
 
 1. Elizabeth Eisenstadt Evans & Yonat Shimron, ‘Sanctuary Churches’ Vow to Shield 
Immigrants from Trump Crackdown, NAT’L CATH. REP. (Nov. 21, 2016), 
https://www.ncronline.org/news/politics/sanctuary-churches-vow-shield-immigrants 
-trump-crackdown. 
 2. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Michael D. Shear, How Trump Came to Enforce a Practice of 
Separating Migrant Families, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2018/06/16/us/politics/family-separation-trump.html. 
 3. Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Jeff Sessions on Federal Law Protections  
for Religious Liberty (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release 
/file/1001891/download. 
 4. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012) (criminalizes “any person who . . . knowing or 
in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United 
States in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts to conceal, 
harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in any place, including any building or any 
means of transportation”). 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012) (stating the federal “[g]overnment may [not] 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion” unless it has a compelling governmental 
interest and the means it chose to fulfill that compelling interest is the least restrictive means). 
 6. Phillip Bump, The Looming Conflict Between Trump’s Immigration Sweeps and 
Religious Freedom, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/news/politics/wp/2017/02/12/the-looming-conflict-between-trumps-immigration 
-sweeps-and-religious-freedom/?utm_term=.5b1671c672be. 
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The standard tools of interpretation have failed to clarify the 
harboring provision in § 1324 of the INA. Judges in the United 
States Courts of Appeals have attempted to use traditional tools to 
get clarity on the ambiguous provision, yet the ambiguity 
remains—not just between circuits, but within some of them. In 
some circuits, “harboring” under § 1324 is interpreted broadly, 
including conduct that merely “substantially facilitates” or “makes 
it easier or less difficult” for an undocumented person to stay in the 
United States.7 In other circuits, the harboring provision is 
interpreted narrowly requiring a specific intent to conceal the 
undocumented person from authorities.8 Still others interpret the 
harboring provision to mean giving an undocumented person “a 
place to stay where it is unlikely that the authorities will be seeking 
him.”9 This ambiguity creates a problem for the religiously 
motivated people who are helping undocumented immigrants all 
around the country by providing food, water, clothing, shelter, or 
sanctuary.10 If the executive branch enforces the harboring 
provision strictly, even against religiously motivated Americans, 
what conduct is covered? 
Consider United States v. Warren.11 The government is 
criminally prosecuting Dr. Scott Daniel Warren, a professor at the 
University of Arizona, for violating the § 1324 prohibition against 
harboring illegal aliens.12 His crime? He “took care”13 of two 
undocumented men who showed up at the door of No More 
 
 7. See infra Section II.A. 
 8. See infra Section II.B. 
 9. United States v. McClellan, 794 F.3d 743, 754 (7th Cir. 2015); see also United States 
v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1050 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 10. For purposes of this Article, “sanctuary” is defined as a nonclandestine form of 
shelter. This is consistent with an understanding of the New Sanctuary Movement. For 
example, see Myrna Orozco & Rev. Noel Andersen, Sanctuary in the Age of Trump:  
The Rise of the Movement a Year into the Trump Administration, CHURCH WORLD SERV. (Jan. 
2018), https://www.sanctuarynotdeportation.org/uploads/7/6/9/1/76912017/sanctuary 
_in_the_age_of_trump_january_2018.pdf. 
 11. United States v. Warren, No. CR 18-002233-TUC-RCC(BPV), 2018 WL 5257807 (D. 
Ariz. May 31, 2018). 
 12. Grand Jury Indictment at 1–2, Warren, 2018 WL 5257807. 
 13. Complaint at 1, Warren, 2018 WL 5257807. 
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Deaths,14 a religiously affiliated organization where he volunteers 
by offering them “food, water, beds, and clean clothes.”15 In the 
government’s view that is illegal—even though the government 
presented no evidence that Dr. Warren concealed the 
undocumented men from detection. In fact, it is arguable that by 
caring for them at a facility known to provide humanitarian relief 
for undocumented people, Warren helped the government locate 
the men.16 What motivated Warren was his religious beliefs. He 
said they “bound [me] to offer assistance to human beings in need 
of basic necessities.”17 
The last time the American legal system endured this 
significant of a conflict between religiously motivated charitable 
conduct and strict enforcement of immigration laws was in the 
1980’s, in what became known as the Sanctuary Trials.18 The court 
resolved that clash in a different religious freedom paradigm. The 
analysis would almost certainly be different today given the new 
religious freedom landscape that has taken shape because of RFRA 
and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence interpreting and applying 
RFRA in cases such as Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao 
do Vegetal19 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc.20 The analysis in this 
new religious freedom landscape reveals a very strong RFRA-
based claim or defense to a broad interpretation of harboring 
under § 1324. 
This Article argues for a RFRA-based statutory construction of 
the INA’s harboring provision, which should influence 
prosecutorial officials—and courts, if necessary—to minimize the 
potential conflict between the two statutes. Moreover, resolving the 
apparent tension between RFRA and the INA highlights a useful 
starting point for re-examining the best way to fulfill RFRA’s 
mandate. RFRA has traditionally been employed on a case-by-case 
 
 14. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts 2 and 3 at 2–3, Warren, 2018 WL 5257807 
[hereinafter Motion to Dismiss] (“No More Deaths is a ministry of the Unitarian Universalist 
Church of Tucson . . . .”). 
 15. Complaint, supra note 13. 
 16. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 14, at 19. 
 17. Id. at 3. 
 18. For an overview of this conflict, see Gregory A. Loken & Lisa R. Bambino, 
Harboring, Sanctuary and the Crime of Charity Under Federal Immigration Law, 28 HARV.  
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119 (1993). 
 19. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 20. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
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exemption basis, but this Article proposes that using RFRA as a 
prophylactic tool of construction is a better way to fulfill its 
mandate when (1) the traditional tools have failed to interpret a 
relevant statute, (2) the statute remains irreducibly ambiguous, and 
(3) one interpretation would result in a large-scale RFRA infirmity. 
This Article will proceed in five parts. Part I describes the 
current confrontation between the executive branch and religious 
communities. Each time the administration cracks down on 
immigration enforcement, especially in traditionally sensitive 
areas, religious communities respond with strong resistance. In 
some cases, they even provide “sanctuary.” Part II demonstrates 
how the INA’s harboring provision remains irreducibly ambiguous 
even after courts have applied standard tools of interpretation. Part 
III examines the recent paradigm shift in how conflicts between a 
federal statute like the INA and religiously motivated conduct are 
resolved and how the various interpretations of the harboring 
provision may or may not survive under that new regime. Part IV 
argues that, in construing statutes like the harboring provision, 
using RFRA as a tool of statutory construction is better than using 
RFRA on a case-by-case accommodation basis. Part V discusses 
how to interpret the harboring provision using RFRA as a tool of 
statutory construction. 
II. THE EMERGING CONFLICT BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH’S 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND RELIGIOUS PEOPLE’S 
ASSISTANCE TO VULNERABLE UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 
On February 8, 2017, a group of Latino men were leaving Rising 
Hope Mission Church in Alexandria, Virginia, when they were 
arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents 
and taken away in vans. Charles Haynes from the First 
Amendment Center writes, “The church’s pastor . . . [is worried] 
that ICE is now targeting churches . . . . ‘They are making people 
fearful of coming to church,’ [Reverand Kerry] Kincannon told a 
local TV station. . . . ‘[W]e are absolutely not going to stand for it.’”21 
 
 21. Charles C. Haynes, Opinion, Haynes: ‘Welcoming the Stranger’ in the Age of Trump, 
PAHRUMP VALLEY TIMES (Mar. 2, 2017, 7:19 PM), https://pvtimes.com/opinion/haynes-
welcoming-the-stranger-in-the-age-of-trump/. 
 
003.INKS_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/19  3:35 AM 
107 Looming RFRA Problem Can Be Solved by RFRA 
 113 
This resolution to stand against aggressive immigration 
enforcement is shared by thousands of other religiously motivated 
people and communities. Since President Trump took office in 
2017, the number of churches offering sanctuary has doubled, from 
about 400 in 2016 to more than 800 in 2017.22 The National Catholic 
Reporter reports that “[t]he election of President Donald Trump 
precipitated [an] outbreak of fear” in the immigration community.23 
The Executive Director of the New Sanctuary Movement, Peter 
Pedemonti, told the National Catholic Reporter that after the election 
of Donald Trump, “[T]here’s been an ‘outpouring of inquiries and 
support’ from congregations across the country that want to sign 
on as sanctuary sites.”24 One Catholic Cardinal, in a February 28, 
2017, letter, told priests and school officials in the archdiocese not 
to allow federal agents onto church property without a warrant.25 
Sacramento’s Roman Catholic Bishop told the press shortly after 
the presidential election that if the administration attempted mass 
deportations of undocumented immigrants, Catholic churches 
would provide refuge: “[W]e have to be ready to respond if and 
when that happens . . . ; [w]e will be true to our values as Catholics 
and Americans.”26 
While the Catholic Church has been one of the strongest critics 
of President Trump’s signature policies to increase deportations,27 
it is not the only faith group helping undocumented immigrants. 
Many houses of worship are providing aid (and sometimes 
 
 22. Gabriella Borter, Under Trump, More Churches Offer Sanctuary but Few Seek Refuge, 
REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2017, 12:06 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration 
-sanctuary/under-trump-more-churches-offer-sanctuary-but-few-seek-refuge-idUSKBN1A 
H350. 
 23. Peter Feuerherd, Churches Upfront About Legal Risks when Providing  
Immigrants Sanctuary, NAT’L CATH. REP. (Sep. 21, 2017) https://www.ncronline.org 
/news/parish/churches-upfront-about-legal-risks-when-providing-immigrants-sanctuary. 
 24. Evans & Shimron, supra note 1. 
 25. Catholic News Serv., Bishops’ Stances Vary on Sanctuary for Immigrants Facing 
Deportation, CATH. PHILLY (Mar. 6, 2017), http://catholicphilly.com/2017/03/news 
/national-news/bishops-stances-vary-on-sanctuary-for-immigrants-facing-deportation/. 
 26. Stephen Magagnini, Churches Could Offer Sanctuary from Mass Deportations, Says 
Sacramento Bishop, SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 2, 2017, 9:09 AM), https://www.sacbee.com 
/news/local/article135865728.html. 
 27. Christopher White, Immigrants Are Seeking Sanctuary in U.S. Churches, CRUX (Mar. 
30, 2017), https://cruxnow.com/interviews/2017/03/30/immigrants-seeking-sanctuary-u 
-s-churches/. 
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sanctuary), including those of the Christian, Muslim, and Jewish 
faiths.28 Jennifer Piper, who works as the Interfaith Organizing 
Director for Immigrant Rights at American Friends Service 
Committee, responded to a media question regarding how her 
work has changed under the Trump administration with the 
following: “We are receiving overwhelming requests to lead 
workshops, as faith communities are disturbed by the 
dehumanizing rhetoric of the current Administration and the 
potential for indiscriminate separation of families.”29 
Such religiously motivated resistance, however, has not slowed 
the President’s aggressive agenda to “take the shackles off” ICE.30 
According to the National Catholic Reporter, between February 1, 
2017, and July 31, 2017, orders of removal and voluntary departure 
have increased 30.9%.31 A month before the aforementioned raid 
outside Rising Hope Mission Church, the President signed an 
executive order entitled “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of 
the United States,” which the American Immigration Council (AIC) 
described as a “massive expansion of interior immigration 
enforcement.”32 According to AIC, the order “defines enforcement 
priorities so broadly as to place all unauthorized individuals at risk 
of deportation, including families, long-time residents, and 
‘Dreamers.’”33 And even though there is a specific policy outlined 
in the Morton Memo of July 2011 that identifies churches as 
“sensitive locations” protected from ICE enforcement, barring 
 
 28. Evans & Shimron, supra note 1; Kimberly Winston, Ohio Mosque is First to Join 
Sanctuary Movement, NAT’L CATH. REP. (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.ncronline.org 
/news/politics/ohio-mosque-first-join-sanctuary-movement. 
 29. White, supra note 27. 
 30. Nick Miroff & Maria Sacchetti, Trump Takes ‘Shackles’ Off ICE, Which is Slapping 
Them on Immigrants Who Thought They Were Safe, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-takes-shackles-off 
-ice-which-is-slapping-them-on-immigrants-who-thought-they-were-safe/2018/02/11/4bd 
5c164-083a-11e8-b48c-b07fea957bd5_story.html?utm_term=.ea234175a8be. 
 31. Feuerherd, supra note 23. 
 32. Summary of Executive Order “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United 
States”, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 1, 1 (2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org 
/sites/default/files/research/summary_of_executive_order_enhancing_public_safety_in_
the_interior_of_the_united_states.pdf. 
 33. Id. 
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emergency circumstances,34 immigration lawyers and watchers 
have called into question the administration’s fidelity to that policy, 
especially given recent raids in sensitive locations, such as the one 
at Rising Hope. Moreover, United States v. Warren illustrates that 
executive officials are including religiously motivated Americans 
in their immigration enforcement priorities. 
This confusion has created a problem both for the religiously 
motivated people providing aid to undocumented people and for 
the government. As the National Latino Evangelical Coalition 
stated, “Churches need to follow their conscience. . . . If they feel 
the need to protect undocumented immigrants, they’re within their 
biblical and theological right to do so.”35 If it is clear to the churches 
that they are within their biblical right to do so, it is less clear to 
them whether they are within their legal right to do so. The Catholic 
Philly reported that the Catholic community is torn over what to do 
about the uptick in deportation enforcement because their 
attorneys have questioned whether they can legally offer 
sanctuary.36 The National Catholic Reporter documented Jesuit 
Father Bryan Pham, a canon and civil lawyer and professor at 
Marymount University in Los Angeles, urging Catholic institutions 
to be cautious of the potential consequences for giving sanctuary: 
“It’s a prophetic stance . . . but there’s no legal defense.”37 Jennifer 
Piper from American Friends Service Committee, however, 
disagrees: “[C]hurches are not breaking laws against ‘harboring 
aliens’ because they are open about which immigrants they have 
taken in, and where.”38 
 
 34. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, on 
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement 
Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June  
17, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion 
-memo.pdf [hereinafter Morton Memo]; FAQ on Sensitive Locations and Courthouse Arrests, 
U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (last updated Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.ice.gov 
/ero/enforcement/sensitive-loc (defining “sensitive locations”). 
 35. Evans & Shimron, supra note 1. 
 36. Loken & Bambino, supra note 18, at 182 n.380. 
 37. Feuerherd, supra note 23. 
 38. Rachel Estabrook, What Makes a Church a Sanctuary for Undocumented Immigrants?, 
COLO. PUB. RADIO (Feb. 20, 2017), http://www.cpr.org/news/story/inside-colorados 
-church-movement-to-protect-immigrants-due-for-deportation. 
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III. THE HARBORING PROVISION IN THE INA 
IS IRREDUCIBLY AMBIGUOUS 
The federal courts, like the churches discussed previously, are 
divided about whether harboring includes providing mere shelter 
or whether it is limited to clandestine sheltering.39 The relevant 
portion of the statute makes it a federal felony for any person to 
knowing[ly] or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has 
come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of 
law, conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts to 
conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in any place, 
including any building or any means of transportation . . . . 40 
Recent cases have brought some clarity to a few circuits, but 
federal courts remain divided about how broadly to interpret this 
criminal provision of the INA. One scholar notes: 
 The anti-harboring provision, however, is quite special. Its 
language presents enormous interpretative problems, most 
obviously in its use of the term “harbor.” How should this 
uncommon word be read? The Supreme Court, in its only 
encounter with the problem in this context, openly admitted it 
was stumped. The Second Circuit was likewise frustrated in its 
attempt to construe the anti-harboring statute in Lopez. “Our task 
would have been lightened,” the court noted dryly, “if Congress 
had expressly defined the word ‘harbor.’”41 
This criminal offense is punishable by a large fine or 
imprisonment and applies to all persons—not just those engaged in 
transporting undocumented people into the United States and not 
just those who are motivated by financial gain.42 Despite the 
severity of the offense and ambiguity over what conduct it covers, 
the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on a uniform definition of 
harboring, nor has Congress elaborated on its meaning. As a result, 
courts have tried to construe the § 1324 prohibition using 
 
 39. SHANE DIZON & NADINE WETTSTEIN, 3 IMMIGRATION LAW SERVICE 2D § 17:56  
(2d ed. 2018). 
 40. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 41. Loken & Bambino, supra note 18, at 143 (footnote omitted). 
 42. See § 1324(a)(1)(B). 
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traditional tools of statutory interpretation. Yet the ambiguity 
remains. 
Even though a survey of the legislative history, congressional 
intent, or textual understanding of the harboring provision43 is 
beyond the scope of this Article, it is important to this Article’s 
broader argument concerning RFRA to note that, even when these 
interpretative tools are employed, the ambiguity remains. For 
example, one court considered the provision’s plain meaning and 
found it to be clearly “directed against those who abet evaders of 
the law against unlawful entry, as the collocation of ‘conceal’ and 
‘harbor’ shows. Indeed, the word ‘harbor’ alone often connotes 
surreptitious concealment.”44 The same circuit, however, later 
found the provision’s plain meaning less clear: “We do not think 
the ordinary meaning of ‘harbors,’ at least with respect to  
whether it entails avoiding detection, is unambiguous. While 
‘harbor’ may sometimes be synonymous with ‘shelter,’ many of its 
most common uses—for example, ‘harboring a fugitive’—also  
connote concealment.”45 
Dictionaries and modern internet searches have not proved 
helpful, either. One court noted, “Dictionaries, either from the 
early twentieth century or today, do not consistently define 
‘harbor’ as containing or lacking an element of concealment.”46 
Another court relied on the 1910 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, 
which states that “a person may be convicted of harboring a slave, 
although he may not have concealed her.”47 But another judge on 
the panel resorted to a Google search and found it “apparent from 
[the] results that ‘harboring,’ as the word is actually used, has a 
connotation—which ‘sheltering’ and a fortiori ‘giving a person a 
 
 43. See, e.g., Emily Breslin, The Road to Liability is Paved with Humanitarian Intentions: 
Criminal Liability for Housing Undocumented People Under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(A)(1)(A)(III), 
RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 214 (2009); Eisha Jain, Immigration Enforcement and Harboring 
Doctrine, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 147 (2010); Loken & Bambino, supra note 18; see also United 
States v. Vargas-Cordon, 733 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040 
(7th Cir. 2012). 
 44. Vargas-Cordon, 733 F.3d at 380 (citing United States v. Mack, 112 F.2d 290, 291 (2d 
Cir. 1940) (L. Hand, J.)). 
 45. Id. at 381. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Costello, 666 F.3d at 1043. 
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place to stay’—does not, of deliberately safeguarding members of 
a specified group from authorities . . . .”48 
Even after considering the placement and structure of the term 
in the statute, it is still unclear what the harboring provision means. 
One court found the placement to suggest that it was  
intended to encompass an element of concealment . . . The other 
two terms—’conceals’ and ‘shields from detection’—both carry an 
obvious connotation of secrecy and hiding. The canon of noscitur 
a sociis would thus suggest that ‘harbors,’ as the third and only 
other term . . . also shares this connotation . . . .49  
But another court found this meant the exact opposite, stating, “We 
needn’t assume that harboring is redundant; it can be given a 
meaning that plugs a possible loophole left open by merely 
forbidding concealing and shielding from detection.”50 This same 
court noted that “[w]hen a statute is broadly worded in order to 
prevent loopholes from being drilled in it by ingenious lawyers, 
there is a danger of its being applied to situations absurdly remote 
from the concerns of the statute’s framers.”51 
This ambiguity in the meaning of “harboring” is not resolved 
by any of the major theoretical approaches to statutory 
interpretation. Plain meaning textualists would seek to resolve the 
ambiguity by looking to context, but each of the alternative 
readings is consistent with § 1324 as a whole: this is not a situation 
where only one of the alternative meanings of a statutory term 
makes sense in light of surrounding provisions. Nor does 
purposivism provide a clear resolution of the ambiguity. Both wide 
and narrow readings of “harboring” are consistent with the 
purposes that a reasonable legislature could have had in enacting  
§ 1324. Finally, an approach to statutory interpretation that focuses 
on the intent of Congress fails to clarify the ambiguity. As is 
frequently the case, the legislative history does not address the 
question adequately.52 
 
 48. Id. at 1044. 
 49. Vargas-Cordon, 733 F.3d at 381. 
 50. Costello, 666 F.3d at 1045. 
 51. Id. at 1046 (quoting Abbot Labs. v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 476 F.3d 421, 426 (7th  
Cir. 2007)). 
 52.  For a more fulsome discussion of the legislative history, see Loken & Babino, supra 
note 18, at 143, and also, generally Breslin supra note 43, and Jain, supra note 43. 
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In sum, “harboring” is irreducibly ambiguous as a matter of 
statutory interpretation from the perspective of textualism, 
purposivism, and intentionalism. This backdrop of irreducible 
ambiguity permits utilizing RFRA as a tool of construction to 
narrowly interpret the statute. For purposes of this Article, I have 
categorized the ambiguity in the circuits into three interpretations: 
a) harboring as merely substantial facilitation, b) harboring as 
substantially facilitating plus evading detection from the 
authorities, and c) harboring as providing a person “a place to stay 
that the authorities are unlikely to be seeking him.”53 
A. The Broadest Interpretation of “Harboring” Includes Mere 
“Substantial Facilitation” of an Undocumented Person’s 
Ability to Stay in the Country 
The broadest interpretation of the harboring provision includes 
conduct that “tends to substantially facilitate” an undocumented 
alien remaining in the United States, regardless of whether the 
defendant intended to conceal the alien from authorities.54 For 
example, the Eighth Circuit held in United States v. Sanchez that a 
couple who had rented an apartment for undocumented aliens and 
promised to help them obtain work and immigration papers were 
guilty under the harboring provision.55 Likewise, in United States v. 
Rushing and United States v. Tipton, the Eighth Circuit held that 
convictions for harboring were sufficiently supported where the 
defendants helped the undocumented persons obtain work and a 
place to live, even if the defendants did not intend to hide them.56 
For decades, the Fifth Circuit held the same broad view about 
what constitutes harboring.57 This view can be summarized by 
United States v. Balderas, where the court ruled that “affording 
 
 53. See United States v. McClellan, 794 F.3d 743, 755 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 54. See United States v. Shum, 496 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 2007) (defining “substantially 
facilitate” to mean making the undocumented person’s stay in the United States “easier or 
less difficult”). 
 55. United States v. Sanchez, 927 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 56. United States v. Tipton, 518 F.3d 591 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Rushing, 313 
F.3d 428 (8th Cir. 2002), judgement vacated (Jan. 14, 2003). 
 57. See, e.g., Shum, 496 F.3d at 390; United States v. De Jesus-Batres, 410 F. 3d 154 (5th 
Cir. 2005); United States v. Valerio-Santibanez, 81 F. App’x. 836 (5th Cir. 2003); United States 
v. Rubio-Gonzales, 674 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Cantu, 557 F.2d 1173 (5th 
Cir. 1977). 
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shelter to an illegal alien is conduct which by its nature tends to 
substantially facilitate the alien’s remaining in the United States . . . .”58 
This view that mere sheltering amounts to harboring maintains that 
Congress intended to broadly proscribe conduct that makes it 
“easier or less difficult”59 for undocumented people to remain in 
the United States, regardless of a specific intent to prevent the 
undocumented person from being detected. The Fifth Circuit, 
however, may have recently signaled a changing viewpoint. In 
Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, the court 
acknowledged that Congress “intended to broadly proscribe any 
knowing or willful conduct fairly within any of these terms that 
tends to substantially facilitate an alien’s remaining in the United 
States illegally[,]”60 but ultimately went in seemingly the opposite 
direction, concluding, “To that end, we have interpreted the 
statutory phrase ‘harbor, shield, or conceal’ to imply that 
‘something is being hidden from detection.”61 
Likewise, in the Ninth Circuit, after decades of finding 
harboring to include substantial facilitation, a similar shift in 
viewpoint may be occurring. In two prominent cases, United States 
v. Acosta de Evans62 and United States v. Aguilar,63 the court held that 
mere provision of shelter could violate the harboring provision. In 
Acosta de Evans, the defendant provided housing to undocumented 
family and friends but argued at trial that she did not intend or try 
to hide them from authorities.64 The court rejected her argument 
and held that her mere provision of shelter was harboring.65 More 
than a decade later, in the Sanctuary Trials, the court held that 
harboring an unlawful alien does not require an intent to evade 
authorities (even though the court went on to find that it was what 
the defendants were in fact doing).66 The court stated:  
 
 58. United States v. Balderas, 91 F. App’x 354, 354 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 59. Shum, 496 F.3d at 392. 
 60. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, Tex., 726 F.3d 524, 529 (5th 
Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Rubio-Gonzalez, 674 F.2d 1067, 1073 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
 61. Id. (quoting United States v. Varkonyi, 645 F.2d 453, 459 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
 62. United States v. Acosta de Evans, 531 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 63. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 64. Acosta, 531 F.2d at 429. 
 65. Id. at 430. 
 66. Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 689–90. 
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In United States v. Acosta de Evans, this court rejected the very claim 
that appellants are making in this case. The court examined the 
legislative history of § 1324(a) and case law from other circuits 
that already addressed the issue, concluding that the word 
‘harbor’ means ‘to afford shelter to’ and does not require an intent 
to avoid detection.67 
Although these two prominent cases have not been overruled, it 
appears the Ninth Circuit may be signaling a change in its view 
about whether a specific intent to help the undocumented person 
evade detection is required as an element of harboring. For instance, 
in United States v. You, the court held that the jurors were properly 
instructed regarding § 1324(a) when they were told they “must find 
that Appellants had acted with ‘the purpose of avoiding the aliens’ 
detection by immigration authorities.”68 Likewise, in United States v. 
Latysheva, the court held “harboring of [undocumented] aliens under 
8 U.S.C.A. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), is a specific intent crime . . . .”69 It is 
unclear in the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits whether harboring under 
§ 1324 requires an intent to conceal an undocumented person and 
not merely substantially facilitating the presence of undocumented 
people. The same ambiguity existed in the Second Circuit until 
United States v. George70 was decided in 2015. I discuss George in 
further detail in my discussion of the narrowest interpretation of the 
harboring provision. 
B. The Narrowest Interpretation of “Harboring” Requires “Substantial 
Facilitation” Plus Preventing Authorities from Detecting the 
Undocumented Individual’s Presence 
The second way courts have tended to interpret 
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) is to find that harboring not only requires 
substantially facilitating an undocumented person’s stay in the 
country, but also a specific intent to help the undocumented person 
evade detection from authorities.  
 
 67. Id. at 690 (citation omitted). 
 68. United States v. You, 382 F.3d 958, 966 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original). 
 69. United States v. Latysheva, 162 F. App’x. 720, 727 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 70. United States v. George, 779 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2015). George was not an en banc 
decision. Id. 
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The Second Circuit followed this approach in a 2015 case called 
United States v. George.71 After acknowledging the decades of 
ambiguity on how to interpret the provision,72 the court held that 
although the government must show the defendant shielded the 
alien from detection or discovery from authorities, it does not have 
to show that the defendant acted secretly or that the hiding was 
necessarily clandestine.73 
“A defendant who intends to conceal an illegal alien from 
authorities may be guilty of harboring,” it explained, “even though 
his conduct ‘lack[s] the hallmarks of active, classic concealment.’”74 
As a result, when the defendant in George argued that “she never 
hid the [immigrant] from visitors nor restricted her movements or 
mistreated her in any way,”75 the court responded that harboring 
requires proof only that the defendant sheltered the immigrant 
“intending to make the alien’s ‘detection by the authorities 
substantially more difficult.’”76 Citing Vargas-Cordon, the George 
court reiterated its previous holding that “where a defendant’s 
conduct ‘undoubtedly diminished the government’s ability to 
locate’ an illegal alien, he was guilty of harboring even if he ‘did not 
actively hide the alien from the outside world.’”77 
The Sixth Circuit takes a slightly different approach. It has held 
that preventing detection from authorities requires some level of 
clandestine behavior. Harboring occurs, in its view, where the 
defendants “clandestinely shelter, succor and protect improperly 
admitted aliens” and conceal them by “shielding [them] from 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 117. 
 73. Id. at 118. 
The George Court said that, prior to its 2013 decision in Vargas-Cordon, 733 F.3d 366 
(2d Cir. 2013), its precedents lacked consistency in construing the harboring provision. 
George, 779 F.3d at 118. So it tried to provide clarity by making clear that Vargas-Cordon 
settled the debate in the Second Circuit that a “defendant’s action must be intended [to not 
only] (1) substantially . . . facilitate an illegal alien’s remaining in the United States, [but also] 
(2) . . . prevent the alien’s detection by immigration authorities . . . .” Id. 
 74. Id. at 119 (quoting Vargas-Cordon, 733 F.3d at 382) (alteration in original); see also 
Vargas-Cordon, 733 F.3d at 382 (“[E]ven if Vargas-Cordon’s conduct lacked the hallmarks of 
active, classic concealment, it nevertheless was intended to make [the undocumented 
immigrant’s] detection by the authorities substantially more difficult.”). 
 75. George, 779 F.3d at 121. 
 76. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 77. Id. (citing Vargas-Cordon, 733 F.3d at 382). 
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observation and preventing [their] discovery.”78 As one court 
recently put it, clandestinely implies that harboring includes the 
“intent to assist the alien’s attempt to evade or avoid detection by 
law enforcement.”79 The addition of clandestine behavior separates 
the Sixth Circuit from the Ninth, Second, or Fifth Circuits by adding 
an additional specific intent that is harder to prove and adds 
protection for those providing aid to undocumented immigrants.80 
Similarly, the Third Circuit found no harboring when the 
government failed to provide sufficient evidence that a woman 
cohabitating with her undocumented boyfriend attempted to 
actively hide him from the authorities.81 “Reasonable control of the 
premises,” the court explained, “is not an element of ‘harboring’ 
under § 1324. Rather, the government had to prove that Silveus’s 
‘conduct tend[ed] substantially to facilitate [the alien’s] remaining 
in the United States illegally and to prevent government authorities 
from detecting his unlawful presence.”82 
The Third Circuit also reversed the conviction of a defendant 
who had done nothing other than provide general advice to an 
undocumented alien, such as saying to “lay low,” “[d]isappear, 
don’t tell anyone what address you’re staying at.”83 The court noted 
that while the legislative history of § 1324 “suggested that Congress 
intended to strengthen the law in ‘preventing aliens from entering 
or remaining in the United States illegally,’” the court had “found 
no cases in which a defendant [had] been convicted under this 
statute for merely giving an alien advice to lay low and to stay away 
from the address on file with INS, obvious information that any 
fugitive would know.”84 The Third Circuit appears to think that 
 
 78. Susnjar v. United States, 27 F.2d 223, 224 (6th Cir. 1928). 
 79. See United States. v. Belevin-Ramales, 458 F. Supp. 2d 409, 410–11 (E.D. Ky. 2006). 
 80. Thus, it is unclear whether the Ninth, Second or Fifth Circuits hold that the 
‘government does not have to prove that the Defendant harbored the alien with 
the intent to assist the alien’s attempt to evade or avoid detection by law 
enforcement’ as provided in the government’s proposed jury instructions. In 
contrast, in Susnjar, the Sixth Circuit clearly stated that the word ‘harbor’ means 
to ‘clandestinely shelter, succor and protect improperly admitted aliens.’ When an 
act is done ‘clandestinely’ it is done secretly or in hiding. 
Id. at 410–11 (citations omitted). 
 81. See United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1003–04 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 82. Id. at 1004. 
 83. United States v. Ozcelik, 527 F.3d 88, 100 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 84. Id. at 98–99. 
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holding defendants criminally liable for low level facilitating of 
undocumented aliens “would effectively write the word 
‘substantially’ out of the test we have undertaken to apply.”85 
Along these same lines, it recently emphasized that “‘harboring’ 
requires some act of obstruction that reduces the likelihood the 
government will discover the alien’s presence.”86 That is more than 
substantially facilitating. 
The Eleventh Circuit articulated a similar interpretation in 
United States v. Dominguez,87 where it reversed the defendants’ 
harboring convictions because the defendants had not substantially 
facilitated the aliens’ “escaping detection from immigration 
officials.”88 The court noted that the defendants took the aliens to 
“experienced immigration counsel shortly after they arrived to 
process them through immigration, and the [aliens] in no way 
engaged in conduct suggesting that they were hiding from or 
otherwise avoiding immigration officials.”89  
In summary, under the narrowest interpretation of the 
harboring provision, courts not only emphasize that the facilitation 
must be substantial, they require specific intent to help the 
undocumented person evade detection by authorities. In some 
courts, this additional element requires clandestine hiding; in 
others, it does not. In some courts, it means helping the migrant 
escape detection; in others, it is merely obstructing the immigration 
authorities from detecting them. In all these circuits, however, 
something more than merely providing shelter is required. 
 
 85. Id. at 101; see also DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Props., Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir. 
2012); United States v. Cuevas-Reyes, 572 F.3d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 86. DelRio-Mocci, 672 F.3d at 246 (citing Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 223 
(3d Cir. 2010), vacated on other grounds, 563 U.S. 1030). 
 87. United States v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 88. Id. at 1063. 
 89. Id. 
Hiding, however, does not necessarily require a physical barrier. For example, 
where defendant employers paid in cash and falsified social security numbers, an Eleventh 
Circuit court found that enough evidence existed for a successful conviction of harboring 
under § 1324. Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1299 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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C. The Middle-of-the-Road Interpretation Is that “Harboring” Requires 
Providing a Person “a Place to Stay in Which the 
Authorities Are Unlikely to Be Seeking Him” 
A third interpretation appears as a middle ground. It is best 
described as requiring something more than “substantial 
facilitation,” but less than a specific intent to conceal the 
undocumented person from authorities. The Seventh Circuit took 
this position in United States v. McClellan.90 Relying on a previous 
Seventh Circuit decision called United States v. Costello, the 
defendant argued that, because he did not shield the 
undocumented person from authorities, he did not harbor them. 
The court, however, disagreed, and distinguished Costello. In 
Costello, the defendant was romantically involved with the man she 
knew was an undocumented alien. The McClellan court notes this 
fact: “We, however, rejected the idea that harboring included 
‘letting your boyfriend live with you.’”91 
McClellan was not romantically cohabitating with an 
undocumented alien. Instead he was employing undocumented 
aliens and providing them “housing to help compensate them for 
the otherwise low wages that he was paying them.”92 Yet, even in 
deciding against the defendant, the Seventh Circuit failed to resolve 
the issue of what constitutes harboring. It appears that “letting your 
[undocumented] boyfriend live with you” does not constitute 
harboring but giving a person a certain kind of shelter without an 
intent to hide them might. One Seventh Circuit judge articulated 
his interpretation of the provision as: 
The terms ‘conceal,’ ‘harbor,’ and ‘shield from detection’ have 
independent meanings, and thus a conviction can result from 
committing (or attempting to commit) any one of the three acts. 
These terms are not defined in the statute, and courts have 
 
 90. United States v. McClellan, 794 F.3d 743, 749 (7th Cir. 2015). See the McClellan 
Court’s characterization of United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 2012): 
He maintains that Costello “reject[ed] the premise that ‘harboring’ can be equated 
to ‘simple shelter in the sense of just providing a place to stay.’” He submits that, 
because he did not take ‘any actions for the purpose of shielding the illegal aliens 
from law enforcement detection,’ his convictions under § 1324 cannot stand. 
Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 750. 
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devoted substantial effort to pinning down their precise meanings 
in the context of the harboring statute . . . “and the office left to 
‘harboring’ is, then, materially to assist an alien to remain illegally 
in the United States without publicly advertising his presence but 
without needing or bothering to conceal it.”93 
In Costello, Judge Posner specifically pointed out that “harboring 
could involve advertising, for instance if a church publicly offered 
sanctuary for illegal aliens and committed to resist any effort by the 
authorities to enter the church’s premises to arrest them.”94 
When the McClellan court distinguished Costello it explained, 
“In striving to define harboring, we observed that ‘harboring as the 
word is actually used has a connotation . . . of deliberately 
safeguarding members of a specified group from the authorities, 
whether through concealment, movement to a safe location, or 
physical protection.’”95 The court reasoned that the harboring 
provision “should be seen as ‘plug[ging] a possible loophole left 
open by merely forbidding concealing and shielding from 
detection.’”96 It then rests on an interpretation of harboring as 
“providing . . . a known illegal alien a secure haven, a refuge, a 
place to stay in which the authorities are unlikely to be seeking 
him.”97 The court emphasized that this interpretation is founded on 
their understanding that the essence of harboring is a “decision to 
provide a refuge for an illegal alien because he’s an illegal alien.”98 
While it remains opaque, this middle-of-the-road interpretation 
appears to require less than specific intent to conceal the alien or 
prevent their detection from authorities.99 But it also appears to 
require more than merely substantially facilitating an 
undocumented person’s ability to stay in the country.100 Moreover, 
 
 93. United States v. Campbell, 770 F.3d 556, 569 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Costello, 666 
F.3d at 1046–47). 
 94. Costello, 666 F.3d at 1047 (emphasis in original). 
 95. McClellan, 794 F.3d at 749 (quoting Costello, 666 F.3d at 1044). 
 96. Id. (citing Costello, 666 F.3d at 1045). 
 97. Id. at 749–50 (quoting Costello, 666 F.3d at 1050). 
 98. Id. at 749 (quoting Costello, 666 F.3d at 1044). 
 99. But see Costello, 666 F.3d at 1048 (“So concealment (‘clandestinely shelter’) is an 
element of harboring.”). 
 100. McClellan, 794 F.3d at 751. 
[I]f our statement in Costello were not sufficiently clear, we hold that, when the 
basis for the defendant’s conviction under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) is providing housing 
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there are two more reasons this middle-of-the-road interpretation 
remains ambiguous. First, until McClellan in 2015, the Seventh 
Circuit held there was not a specific intent requirement for a 
violation of § 1324.101 Secondly, as recently as 2009, the Seventh 
Circuit held in United States v. Ye that the language “conduct 
tending substantially to facilitate,” which originated in the Second 
Circuit,102 was unwelcome in the Seventh Circuit.103 The Seventh 
Circuit has still not cleared up what specific conduct is covered by 
the harboring provision. 
This lack of clarity within and between the federal circuits 
regarding how to interpret the harboring provision is important to 
the religiously motivated people described in Part I. Depending on 
how broadly or narrowly the harboring provision is interpreted, 
the religiously motivated conduct of churches could be implicated. 
Moreover, just as there is a spectrum of interpretations for the 
harboring provision, there is also a spectrum of pertinent 
 
to a known illegal alien, there must be evidence from which a jury could conclude, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant intended to safeguard that alien 
from the authorities. Such intent can be established by showing that the defendant 
has taken actions to conceal an alien by moving the alien to a hidden location or 
providing physical protection to the alien. 
Id. 
 101. Id. at 755. 
Indeed, we noted on more than one occasion in Li that there was no law from this 
circuit holding that § 1324 incorporates a specific intent requirement and, 
relatedly, no circuit law requiring a specific intent instruction. We also observed 
that counsel’s general intent instruction was consistent with the approach of 
several other circuits. 
Id. 
 102. See United States v. Lopez, 521 F.2d 437, 441 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 103. United States v. Ye, 588 F.3d 411, 417 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Because we decline to import 
that statutory interpretation into the law of this Circuit, we conclude that the district court’s 
supplemental jury instruction was not erroneous.” (footnote omitted)). The court further 
noted: 
Whether that conduct ’tends substantially‘ to assist an alien is irrelevant, for the 
statute requires no specific quantum or degree of assistance. 
  Congress could not have been clearer: it said that concealing, harboring, or 
shielding from detection an alien is unlawful conduct, regardless of how effective 
a defendant’s efforts to help the alien might tend to be. If a person commits a 
relatively nominal act that is proscribed by § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), the executive 
branch has the discretion to forego prosecution. Courts’ overlaying the statute 
with the ’tending substantially‘ veneer appropriates that discretion and also 
invades the province of Congress by de-criminalizing lesser forms of conduct 
—i.e., actions that only ’tend slightly or moderately‘ to help an alien. 
Id. at 416. 
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religiously motivated conduct. On one end of the spectrum is the 
church or person that does nothing more than shelter people 
regardless of their status—for instance, a hypothermia shelter that 
provides free shelter and knowingly includes undocumented 
immigrants in their population. It is plausible in some circuits that 
this behavior could constitute a criminal violation of harboring. On 
the other end of the spectrum is a church that is openly providing 
“sanctuary” to an undocumented person, such as the church 
featured on the cover of the Washington Post on March 31, 2018.104 
That church, the United Methodist Church of Mancos in Colorado, 
is offering sanctuary to Rosa Sabido, an undocumented woman 
who has lived in the United States for thirty years.105 This would 
almost certainly constitute harboring in some circuits. 
IV. RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN FEDERAL STATUTES AND 
RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED CONDUCT UNDER THE RFRA REGIME 
Given the increased efforts by religiously motivated people to 
resist a “zero-tolerance”106 immigration policy, and the unresolved 
ambiguity in the federal circuits regarding interpreting the INA’s 
§ 1324, it is not hard to foresee a conflict between the harboring 
provision and religiously motivated conduct towards the 
undocumented alien. This is not the first time, however, that the 
executive branch has had to deal with a conflict between its 
immigration policies and resistance from religious communities. In 
the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan’s immigration policy in Central 
America was strongly resisted by religious communities who called 
themselves the “Sanctuary Movement.”107 Gregory Loken and Lisa 
Bambino recount the story of Maria Aguilar, the woman whose 
 
 104.  Stephanie McCrummen, A Sanctuary of One, WASH. POST, (Mar. 31, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/national/wp/2018/03/31/feature/after-30 
-years-in-america-she-was-about-to-be-deported-then-a-tiny-colorado-church-offered-her 
-sanctuary/?utm_term=.6613fb9c4e69. 
 105. Id.; see also Loken & Bambino, supra note 18, at 141 (“The broadest contingent of 
sanctuary churches and workers have been engaged in the reactive, non-clandestine shelter 
of the undocumented.”). 
 106. Press Release, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Attorney General 
Announces Zero-Tolerance Policy for Criminal Illegal Entry (April 6, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-zero-tolerance-policy-
criminal-illegal-entry. 
 107. See generally, ANN CRITTENDEN, SANCTUARY: A STORY OF AMERICAN CONSCIENCE 
AND THE LAW IN COLLISION (1988). 
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name would become famous as one of the defendants in the 
Sanctuary Trials of the 1980s: 
 Maria, a graying, recently widowed woman of fifty-seven, 
knelt to say the rosary. No doubt she needed the spiritual strength 
it provided, for her house was full of destitute foreigners sent to 
her by her parish priest. Beside her was a man named Jesús, who 
joined in her prayer. According to the ancient forms, they would 
introduce each decade of Hail Mary’s with the Lord’s Prayer and 
the words “Thy kingdom come.” They would conclude by 
addressing the Virgin Mary: “To thee do we cry, poor banished 
children of Eve; to thee do we send up our sighs, mourning and 
weeping in this valley of tears.” Yet while they spoke the same 
words, their motivations could not have been more contrary: 
Maria del Socorro Pardo de Aguilar believed it her duty to shelter 
those whom civil war had banished from their homeland; Jesús 
Cruz was attempting to prove Mrs. Aguilar guilty of a federal 
crime for acting on that belief.108 
Several years later, Maria Aguilar and seven other religious 
workers were prosecuted under § 1324’s harboring provision109 and 
convicted of federal felonies for acting on their religious beliefs.110 
Yet, the Sanctuary Movement persisted.111 
The Sanctuary Trials of the 1980s revealed that, under the 
former religious freedom paradigm, a religious defense to 
harboring an undocumented person was weak. A legal memo 
written on October 31, 1983, by Ted Olson, then the Assistant 
Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, said that 
“[p]roviding church sanctuary to illegal aliens probably violates 8 
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3), which forbids the harboring of illegal aliens.”112 
The memo continued,  
 Courts are unlikely to recognize church sanctuary as legally 
justified under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 
because disagreement with the government’s treatment of aliens 
 
 108. Loken & Bambino, supra note 18, at 119. 
 109. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(C) (2012) is the successor under the Immigration Control and 
Reform Act of 1986 to the anti-harboring provision applicable to the Aguilar defendants. 
United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 110. Aguilar, 883 F. 2d at 709. 
 111. See Loken & Bambino, supra note 18, at 121–22. 
 112. Church Sanctuary for Illegal Aliens, 7 Op. O.L.C. 168, 168 (1983). 
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is not a religious belief that is burdened by enforcement of the 
immigration laws, and the government has a compelling 
countervailing interest in uniform law enforcement.113  
Olson concluded, “[t]he integrity of our government would be 
seriously threatened if individuals could escape the criminal law by 
pleading religious necessity.”114  
 Since the Sanctuary Trials, however, a dramatic shift has 
occurred in religious freedom law, with the 1993 Federal RFRA, 
and Supreme Court cases applying RFRA, such as Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (2006)115 and, perhaps 
most importantly, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014).116 This 
change in the religious freedom landscape creates a viable religious 
defense to the broadest interpretation of the harboring provision 
(conduct that merely “substantially facilitates”). 
“Congress enacted RFRA in 1993 in order to provide very broad 
protection for religious liberty.”117 It states: 
§ 2000bb-1. Free exercise of religion protected 
(a) In general 
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule 
of general applicability, except as provided in subsection 
(b). 
(b) Exception 
Government may substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that 
application of the burden to the person— 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest. 
(c) Judicial relief 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 171. 
 115. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 420 
(2006). 
 116. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 693 (2014). 
 117. Id. 
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A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in 
violation of this section may assert that violation as a 
claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain 
appropriate relief against a government. Standing to 
assert a claim or defense under this section shall be 
governed by the general rules of standing under article III 
of the Constitution.118 
In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court stated, “By enacting RFRA, 
Congress went far beyond what this Court has held is 
constitutionally required.”119 RFRA requires the government to 
not substantially burden a person’s religious exercise unless the 
government can show a compelling interest and that it is 
implemented in the least restrictive means. The next three sections 
analyze each of the three previously outlined harboring 
interpretations under the new religious freedom paradigm 
created by RFRA (and the Supreme Court’s RFRA jurisprudence), 
showing that there is a viable RFRA claim or defense to at least 
the broadest interpretation. 
A. A “Substantial Burden on a Person’s Religious Exercise” Will Be 
Demonstrated Under All Interpretations of the Harboring Provision 
During the Sanctuary Trials, the government brought in so-
called experts120 to testify to the centrality of the religious beliefs at 
issue.121 These experts testified that helping an immigrant flee 
persecution by offering them sanctuary was not central to the 
Christian faith.122 Persuaded by the experts’ testimony, the court 
found that the defendant’s religious beliefs were not substantially 
burdened because the beliefs were not mandated or central.123 
Specifically, the court noted that the defendants could have found 
other ways to express their faith.124 
 
 118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) (2000). 
 119. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 at 706. 
 120. See generally, WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM xxii–xxv (new ed. 2018). 
 121. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 694 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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RFRA as amended, however, says that it covers “any exercise 
of religion whether or not compelled [by] or central . . . .”125 
Moreover, Congress mandated that RFRA “be construed in favor 
of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent 
permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.”126 In 
Hobby Lobby, the Court noted that this broad deference regarding 
what constitutes a religious belief is found both in the Court’s Free 
Exercise jurisprudence (citing previous decisions such as 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith 
(Employment Division v. Smith)127) and RFRA itself: 
RFRA’s question is whether the mandate imposes a substantial 
burden on the objecting parties’ . . . with their religious beliefs. . . .  
It is not for the Court to say that the religious beliefs of the 
plaintiffs are mistaken or unreasonable. . . . The Court’s “narrow 
function . . . is to determine” whether the plaintiffs’ asserted 
religious belief reflects “an honest conviction . . . .”128 
The Supreme Court was clear that it is not the province of the 
judiciary to determine whether a religious belief is flawed, 
plausible, mistaken, substantial, or reasonable.129 
 
First, the court was unconvinced that section 1324 unduly burdened defendants’ 
free exercise of religion, noting: “Representatives of Catholic and Methodist clergy 
testified at the pretrial hearing and trial. None suggested that devout Christian 
belief mandates participation in the ‘sanctuary movement.’ Obviously, 
[defendants] could have assisted beleaguered El Salvadorans in many ways which 
did not affront border control laws . . . .” 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 956 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
 125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012). 
 126. Id. § 2000cc-3(g); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 684 
(2014) (“First, nothing in RFRA as originally enacted suggested that its definition of ‘exercise 
of religion’ was meant to be tied to pre-Smith interpretations of the First Amendment. 
Second, if RFRA’s original text were not clear enough, the RLUIPA amendment surely 
dispels any doubt that Congress intended to separate the definition of the phrase from that 
in First Amendment case law.”). 
 127. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 128. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 686. 
 129. Id. at 724–25; see Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (“Repeatedly and in many different contexts, 
we have warned that courts must not presume to determine . . . the plausibility of a religious 
claim.”); see also Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981) (“[I]t 
is not for us to say that the line he drew was an unreasonable one. Courts should not 
undertake to dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits that he is ‘struggling’ with 
his position or because his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and precision that a 
more sophisticated person might employ.”). 
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For a successful defense based on RFRA, however, it must also 
be proven that, whatever the religious belief, it was substantially 
burdened. First, a violation of § 1324 is a criminal felony.130 That 
alone would likely prove a substantial burden. Secondly, 
however, the punishment for each count of violating § 1324 comes 
with a maximum of a $10,000 fine plus five years in prison,131 as 
well as the potential for forfeiture of property. For violations of 
§ 1324 committed for commercial or economic gain, the 
punishments are higher.132 
Regardless of which interpretation of the harboring provision 
is used, the new religious freedom paradigm no longer allows 
judicial testing of the centrality of a person’s religious beliefs as it 
did in the old paradigm. Furthermore, because violating § 1324 is a 
criminal offense and the punishment is grave, this first RFRA 
element of a “substantial burden on religious belief” will likely be 
met under all the interpretations. 
B. Under a Broad Interpretation of the Harboring Provision, 
the Government Will Not Be Able to Show 
a Sufficiently Compelling Interest 
When the defendants in the 1980s Sanctuary Trials invoked 
their Free Exercise Clause defense, they came up against a 
powerful, categorical “overriding” governmental interest.133 The 
court found that the government’s power to regulate immigration 
was so compelling that it trumped any religiously motivated 
conduct.134 A major paradigm shift, however, is being born in the 
way the Court thinks about the federal power to regulate 
immigration. This paradigm shift in immigration law is important 
because it submits the government’s power in immigration to 
scrutiny by the judiciary in new ways. 
 
 130. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(B)(i)–(iv) (2012). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 695 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 134. Id.; see also United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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1. The government’s interest in enforcing immigration laws is not as 
categorically exceptional as it once was 
It is well-known that the federal government has strong power 
to regulate its borders.135 As one scholar noted, in the former 
immigration law paradigm, “constitutional rights that shaped 
other areas of law enforcement were effectively inapplicable” in the 
immigration context.136 Another scholar’s research points out that, 
“probably no other area of American law has been so radically 
insulated and divergent from those fundamental norms of 
constitutional right, administrative procedure, and judicial role 
that animate the rest of our legal system.”137 The reasons for the 
divergence of immigration law from the rest of American law in 
adhering to legal norms is the subject of extensive research and 
scholarship, and outside the scope of this Article.138 For purposes of 
this Article, what is relevant is that the government’s immigration 
power is no longer viewed as categorically exceptional as it once 
was. While the power may have once been considered plenary 
enough that it would override—with remarkable deference to the 
federal government—the substantive rights of even American 
citizens, this is changing. 
The federal government’s plenary power in immigration 
started to face restrictions at the turn of the twenty-first century 
 
 135. The government’s ability to exclude aliens is “essential to its safety, its 
independence, and its welfare[.]” Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893); 
see also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 136. Michael Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Problem, 104 GEO. 
L.J. 125, 129 (2015) [hereinafter Fourth Amendment Problem]. 
 137. Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 
(1984); see also David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 
111 NW. U. L. REV. 583, 594–95 (2017) (“[J]udicial review of federal immigration law under 
the ‘plenary power doctrine’ is extremely lax and forgiving. Thus, substantive constitutional 
rights—such as equal protection, due process, freedom of association, and so on—tend to 
garner less judicial scrutiny in immigration cases than other areas of federal regulation.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 138. “The academic literature on immigration exceptionalism is legion, featuring 
commentary from nearly every prominent immigration law scholar, and others, over the past 
four decades.” Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 137, at 588 n.21; see also Oceanic Steam 
Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909) (“Over no conceivable subject is the 
legislative power of Congress more complete . . . .”); Fourth Amendment Problem, supra note 
136, at 136 (2015); Stephen H Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary 
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255 (1984) (plenary power rendered immigration 
law a “constitutional oddity”). 
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with the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis,139 in which 
the Supreme Court sought to answer whether immigration law 
permitted the indefinite detention of noncitizens.140 As Professor 
Michael Kagan articulated: 
 In Zadvydas, the Court introduced two critical constitutional 
tools that continue to provide fodder for constitutional challenges 
to immigration law. First, in response to the government’s 
argument that plenary power permitted indefinite detention, the 
Court said “that power is subject to important constitutional 
limitations” . . . . After a century of plenary power meaning 
unlimited or nearly unreviewable power, Chadha and Zadvydas 
returned immigration law to a more normal constitutional path, 
wherein Congress has authority, but must still respect 
fundamental rights.141 
The Court resolved the question in Zadvydas by interpreting the 
relevant portion of the INA regarding indefinite detentions to 
require a hearing, thereby avoiding the constitutional question.142 A 
decade later in Arizona v. United States, when the Court was 
presented with a state law that made it a misdemeanor to violate a 
federal law regarding alien-registration requirements, the Court said 
that the state law was preempted, not because the federal 
government’s power over immigration is inherent in national 
sovereignty (the traditional rationale under immigration 
exceptionalism), but because of enumerated constitutional federal 
powers such as “naturalization.”143 “In short, sovereignty is not a 
reason why the Constitution should not apply,” one scholar noted.144 
“The exclusivity principle seems to have less traction in the Supreme 
 
 139. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Michael Kagan argues persuasively that 
the shift actually started to occur in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). “What the Court did 
in Chadha was to begin to normalize immigration law within the broader context of 
administrative law. . . . Chadha was a critical step by which the Court gradually reintroduced 
the possibility of meaningful constitutional scrutiny, setting the stage for more dramatic 
changes in the twenty-first century.” Fourth Amendment Problem, supra note 136, at 141. 
 140. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678. 
 141. Fourth Amendment Problem, supra note 136, at 143–44. 
 142. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678. 
 143. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012). 
 144. Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 137, at 616. 
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Court than it once did.”145 The rationale in Arizona v. United States 
revealed that the shift started by Zadvydas was gaining traction. 
The same is true in Kerry v. Din.146 Although the Court rejected 
the claim of a United States citizen that her due process rights were 
violated when immigration authorities failed to specify the 
reason(s) her foreign husband was not allowed to enter the United 
States, the decision was closely decided.147 One of the reasons it was 
closely decided was because, although Din was a citizen exerting 
her due process claim as derived from her association with an 
undocumented person, the person was not yet in the country. This 
is important because “the federal government’s plenary authority 
to regulate immigration . . . was usually assumed to be at its height 
when a noncitizen had not yet entered the country.”148 
Just recently, in Sessions v. Morales (2017), the Court dealt a 
strong blow to immigration law’s exceptionalism in ruling that the 
INA violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.149 The Court held that because the INA granted or 
denied benefits based on the gender of the qualifying parent, it is 
subject to heightened review under the Court’s equal protection 
 
 145. Id. at 605. 
 146. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015); see also Michael Kagan, Plenary Power is Dead! 
Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 21 (2015) [hereinafter 
Plenary Power is Dead] (“Kerry v. Din[] [was] a case in which a U.S. citizen, Fauzia Din, 
challenged the State Department’s refusal to grant a visa to her Afghan husband, Kanishka 
Berashk, effectively refusing the couple the right to live together. Din argued that the visa 
denial infringed her right to marriage, and as a matter of due process, the State Department 
owed her a specific explanation for the decision. The State Department had given no 
explanation except for a vague reference to the statute banning people who have engaged in 
terrorist activities from entering the United States. Din did not ask the Court to rule on 
whether her husband actually was a terrorist. Rather, she asked for a process that would 
meaningfully allow the couple to respond to the allegations.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 147. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015); see also Plenary Power is Dead, supra note 146, at 22. 
[In Kerry v. Din, Fauzia Din won] four justices on the Court: Justices Breyer, 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Moreover, her challenge severely divided the 
other five Justices, so much so that there is no controlling decision for the case. 
Only two justices—Justices Kennedy and Alito—used an analysis based on 
plenary power doctrine as it has been traditionally known in immigration law. Yet, 
even they were willing to assume for the sake of argument that Din was owed 
some measure of due process. The plurality opinion by Justice Scalia largely 
sidestepped the Court’s immigration jurisprudence and focused instead on a 
critique of substantive due process jurisprudence generally. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 148. Plenary Power is Dead, supra note 146, at 22. 
 149. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017). 
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jurisprudence. To be valid, such legislation must serve an 
important government objective and the means of accomplishing it 
must be substantially related to that objective. In this instance, the 
INA failed that test.150 
One of the most recent Supreme Court cases to touch upon the 
government’s immigration power was Jennings v. Rodriguez 
(2018).151 In it, the Court punted the constitutional question 
whether the government’s power to enforce immigration was so 
strong as to not require a bond hearing for prolonged immigration 
detention.152 At the time of this writing, the Ninth Circuit will 
decide the constitutionality of the government’s power to detain an 
immigrant without a bond hearing. While Jennings v. Rodriguez 
initially appears to shift the paradigm back to pre-Zadvydas, a 
careful analysis reveals that the reasoning behind the case had 
much more to do with statutory interpretation and the doctrine of 
Constitutional avoidance than the fundamental issue of plenary 
power. It is possible that the Court’s punt means it did not want to 
advance the “important constitutional limitations” set forth in 
Zadvydas. It could also be the Supreme Court choosing, as it often 
does, to make legal changes slowly and incrementally. In any case, 
this decision did not send backwards the new paradigm of 
normalizing immigration law within U.S. law. Professor Kagan has 
articulated the second view: 
 Just as the Court has become more willing to find 
constitutional limitations on immigration enforcement, it has also 
changed its conception of the foundations of that power. The 
Court continues to hold that the federal government has broad 
immigration authority, but it has more recently rooted this 
authority in constitutionally enumerated powers, specifically 
naturalization, foreign affairs, and the impact on commerce. 
These two changes—finding both a source and a limit for 
immigration law in the Constitution—push strongly toward 
normalizing immigration within constitutional law.153 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018), remanded to 909 F.3d 252 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(remanding to consider the constitutional question). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Plenary Power is Dead, supra note 146, at 25. 
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At a macro level, there is a change in basic assumptions about 
immigration law generally. The government’s interest in enforcing 
immigration laws is not as categorically exceptional as it once was. 
It is now subject to “important constitutional limitations”154 and, as 
Professor Kagan articulates, is grounded in enumerated powers, 
not inherent in being the sovereign.155 In the Sanctuary Trials, the 
court gave broad deference to the government’s immigration 
interest regardless of whether it burdened a citizen’s free exercise 
of religion or other constitutional rights; the Court is unlikely to 
give such broad deference again. 
2. The government’s interest is not focused enough to survive RFRA 
scrutiny under the broadest interpretation of the harboring provision 
Because the government’s interest in enforcing immigration 
laws is no longer categorically exceptional and outside the norms 
of American law, and because Congress did not exempt the INA 
from RFRA, the court would likely subject the INA’s harboring 
provision to a compelling interest standard under RFRA. What 
specific goal is the government trying to accomplish with the 
harboring provision? This depends on what interpretation is being 
analyzed. If it is the broadest interpretation—merely “substantial 
facilitation”—then the interest appears to be the government’s 
desire to disincentivize undocumented people from being in the 
United States. Anyone, including religiously motivated citizens, is 
in violation of the statute if she makes it “easier or less difficult”156 
for the undocumented person to stay in the country. If it is the 
narrowest interpretation—substantial facilitation plus specific 
intent to conceal from detection—then it appears that the 
government’s interest is the ability to find undocumented people if 
they choose to. If it is the mid-way interpretation—providing a 
person “a place to stay in which the authorities are unlikely to be 
seeking him” 157—then it appears that the government’s interest is 
having undocumented people easily accessible. These varying 
interpretations of the harboring provision affect what the 
government’s purported compelling interest is, which means they 
 
 154. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001). 
 155. Plenary Power is Dead, supra note 146, at 25. 
 156. United States v. Shum, 496 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 157. United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1050 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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also directly affect the viability of a claim or defense under RFRA. In 
this section, I subject each one of these harboring interpretations to 
the compelling interest test of RFRA scrutiny. I analyze them at a 
micro level, since the compelling interest that the government may 
attempt to advance under its formerly plenary power doctrine has 
already been shown as weak. 
Under the broadest interpretation—harboring as merely 
“substantial facilitation”—the government’s argument is that it has 
a compelling interest in enforcing immigration laws uniformly and 
needs to be able to punish anyone, without exception, who merely 
substantially helps an undocumented immigrant stay in the 
country. This interpretation reveals the weakest governmental 
interest. The government must show that in spite of the twelve 
million undocumented people that have not faced prosecution 
—some of them for many years and with fluctuating stages of 
status—it has a compelling interest in criminally prosecuting 
citizens for making it easier for an undocumented person to remain 
in the United States, regardless of whether the citizen is exercising 
a fundamental right such as being religiously motivated to aid the 
undocumented immigrant. 
In the old religious freedom paradigm which existed during the 
Sanctuary Trials, the court was concerned about the consequences 
of granting a Free Exercise defense that could create a “personal 
immigration polic[y].”158 They reasoned that, if they allowed an 
exception to the harboring provision for religiously motivated 
conduct, even if interpreted as merely “substantial facilitation,” it 
“would result in no immigration policy at all.”159 This common 
bureaucratic concern for uniform enforcement, however, has been 
decisively dismantled in the new religious freedom law paradigm. 
RFRA requires a “more focused inquiry.”160 In Gonzales v. O Centro 
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal the Supreme Court 
demonstrated this new shift when it applied RFRA to the 
Controlled Substances Act, 161 which the government argued could 
 
 158. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 696 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,  
420 (2006). 
 161. Id. at 439. 
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not accommodate exceptions, even towards a religious group’s 
sacramental use of hoasca.162 The Court found that RFRA requires 
a determination of whether exceptions, including to criminal laws, 
are possible.163 
The government’s argument in O Centro, that it maintained a 
general interest in uniform enforcement of the Controlled 
Substance Act as a “‘closed’ system that prohibits all use of 
controlled substances . . . [and] ‘cannot function with its necessary 
rigor and comprehensiveness if subjected to judicial exemptions,’” 
was flatly rejected.164 The Court has previously stated that “only 
those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served 
can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”165 
Although the compelling interest standard must be applied to the 
particularized facts of a case,166 the broad interpretation of the 
harboring provision will likely not pass RFRA’s compelling interest 
scrutiny (which the Supreme Court called “onerous”167) in the large 
swath of cases where religiously motivated people are merely 
“substantially facilitating” undocumented immigrants. 
Under the narrowest interpretation—harboring as substantial 
facilitation plus specific intent to conceal from detection—the 
government’s argument is likely that it has a compelling interest in 
being able to detect undocumented people. As a result, it also has a 
compelling interest in being able to punish anyone who conceals the 
undocumented persons such that the government cannot detect 
them. This is the government’s interest almost at its strongest.168 
The government is acknowledging it does not have the capacity to 
 
 162. Hoasca is “a hallucinogenic tea . . . made from two plants found only in the 
Amazon rain forest,” including a controversial substance called DMT. Linda Greenhouse, 
Sect Allowed to Import Its Hallucinogenic Tea, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2006), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2006/02/22/politics/sect-allowed-to-import-its-hallucinogenic-tea.html. 
 163. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 439. 
 164. Id. at 430. 
 165. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). 
 166. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 726 (2014) (“[RFRA] requires 
the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through 
application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particularized claimant whose sincere 
exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.” (quoting O Centro, 546 U.S. at 430–31)). 
 167. See id. at 729 n.37. 
 168. The government’s interest could be stronger if the provision were even more 
narrowly interpreted so as to prevent the concealing of undocumented people known to be, 
or in reckless disregard of the fact, criminals. See Jain, supra note 43. 
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deport the millions of undocumented people living in the country, 
but it is focusing on its more specific interest in being able to detect 
undocumented people, should it need or want to deport them. This 
may pass RFRA’s compelling interest test because it is not “whole 
system” enforcement; rather, it is more specifically focused.169  
The mid-way interpretation—providing a “person a place 
where the authorities are unlikely to be seeking him”—is likely to 
fall in between the broadest and narrowest interpretations on the 
compelling interest spectrum. It appears the government’s interest 
is that it should have easy access to undocumented persons. This 
interpretation is the most challenging to analyze under the 
Supreme Court’s RFRA jurisprudence of the compelling interest 
standard because it is unclear whether the Court would find this 
interest overly broad. It is also difficult because little guidance is 
given to what is meant by a place where “it is unlikely that the 
authorities will be seeking him”170 and who determines this. The 
fact that authorities are unlikely to be seeking an undocumented 
person in a sanctuary (because they are “sensitive” locations171) 
could further complicate this interpretation for religiously 
motivated people. 
In summary, while the government’s immigration power may 
be strong and comprehensive, it is no longer outside the boundaries 
of constitutional norms. Unlike in the Sanctuary Trials, the federal 
government must show that its interest is compelling, not as a 
system, but in a more focused way. If the government is 
prosecuting a religiously motivated person under the broadest 
interpretation of the harboring provision (merely “substantial 
facilitation”), it is likely going to fail showing it has a compelling 
interest under RFRA. It is no longer sufficient for the government 
to argue it has a compelling interest in the uniform enforcement of 
a criminal law, even if it is an immigration law.172 If the government 
 
 169. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 419. 
 170. United States v. McClellan, 794 F.3d 743, 755 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 171. FAQ on Sensitive Locations and Courthouse Arrests, supra note 34. 
 172. The one exception to this seems to be the taxation system. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 
at 733–34 (2014). 
  HHS also raises for the first time in this Court the argument that applying the 
contraceptive mandate to for-profit employers with sincere religious objections is 
essential to the comprehensive health-insurance scheme that ACA establishes. 
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is prosecuting a religiously motivated person under the narrowest 
interpretation, or possibly under the middle view of the harboring 
provision (substantial facilitation plus intent to conceal from 
detection or providing a place where the authorities are unlikely to 
be seeking him, respectively), it may prevail in showing that it has 
a compelling interest because its interest is more focused on being 
able to find undocumented people rather than a broadly 
formulated interest in uniform enforcement of immigration laws. 
C. Under the Broadest Interpretation, the Government’s Exceptions for 
Analogous Secular Conduct Will Prevent a Showing That it 
Used the Least Restrictive Means as Required by RFRA 
RFRA’s last requirement is that, assuming the government can 
show it has a compelling interest, it must also show there are no 
other means of achieving this interest without imposing a 
substantial burden on religion.173 This last standard of RFRA is 
“exceptionally demanding.”174 The broadest interpretation of the 
provision will likely not pass the compelling interest test of RFRA. 
But, even if the court were willing to assume, for the sake of 
 
HHS analogizes the contraceptive mandate to the requirement to pay Social 
Security taxes, which we upheld in Lee despite the religious objection of an 
employer, but these cases are quite different. Our holding in Lee turned primarily 
on the special problems associated with a national system of taxation. . . . We 
observed that “[t]he tax system could not function if denominations were allowed 
to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that 
violates their religious belief.” 
  Lee was a free-exercise, not a RFRA, [sic] case, but if the issue in Lee were 
analyzed under the RFRA framework, the fundamental point would be that there 
simply is no less restrictive alternative to the categorical requirement to pay taxes. 
Because of the enormous variety of government expenditures funded by tax 
dollars, allowing taxpayers to withhold a portion of their tax obligations on 
religious grounds would lead to chaos. 
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982)). 
It is worth further distinguishing Lee by noting that the Court said that the social 
security system rests on “a complex of actuarial factors,” Lee, 455 U.S. at 259, and that 
exceptions could not be made because the very purpose of the system depended on everyone 
participating: “Moreover, a comprehensive national social security system providing for 
voluntary participation would be almost a contradiction in terms and difficult, if not 
impossible, to administer.” Id. at 258. 
 173. Under this test, the government would have to show that it “lacks other means of 
achieving its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion.” 
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 728. 
 174. Id. 
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argument, that the government did meet its burden in showing a 
compelling interest, the broadest interpretation will still likely not 
survive RFRA’s least restrictive means test. This is especially true 
because the government will be hard pressed to show why 
religiously motivated people cannot also provide non-clandestine 
humanitarian aid when secular institutions are being permitted to 
do so. 
Moreover, assuming the government had the desire and 
capacity to deport every undocumented person, it could still 
accomplish that goal if undocumented people are being provided 
with aid or shelter openly. Even if the government could show that 
allowing citizens to provide non-clandestine aid to undocumented 
people made it more expensive for the government to apprehend 
these undocumented immigrants, the court would likely find this a 
worthy cost. “[RFRA] may in some circumstances require the 
Government to expend additional funds to accommodate citizens’ 
religious beliefs.”175 Congress understood that protecting religious 
exercise may increase the government’s costs and was willing to 
accept that cost; “[t]his chapter may require a government to incur 
expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial 
burden on religious exercise.”176 
Not only is the government likely to fail the least restrictive 
means test of RFRA because it has “other means” of finding 
undocumented immigrants while still allowing them to receive 
humanitarian aid, but the government itself has already allowed 
an analogous system of substantial facilitation through 
humanitarian aid to undocumented immigrants available for 
secular institutions such as public schools and hospitals.177 The 
government's argument that it cannot more narrowly tailor its 
means therefore is fatally flawed. 
In Hobby Lobby, when discussing the system of exceptions to the 
contraceptive mandate provided for in the Affordable Care Act, the 
Court noted: “Although HHS has made this system available to 
religious nonprofits that have religious objections to the 
contraceptive mandate, HHS has provided no reason why the same 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(c) (2012). 
 177. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012). 
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system cannot be made available [to corporations].”178 Likewise, a 
person with a RFRA claim or defense could argue that the 
government already has a system of exceptions available that 
allows, and even mandates, substantial facilitation to 
undocumented people. Undocumented immigrants are permitted 
to send their (also potentially undocumented) children to public 
school.179 Moreover, public schools are not allowed to inquire or 
report the status of undocumented immigrants.180 Hospitals are 
required to provide emergency care to undocumented people.181 
Undocumented immigrants have many of the same labor rights as 
authorized workers under federal law, including the ability to 
receive workers compensation, join a union, receive state disability 
benefits, and report health and safety violations.182 Although state 
law is beyond the scope of this Article, some states provide more 
extensive opportunities for undocumented people.183 
 
 178. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 692. 
 179. Doe, 457 U.S. at 205. 
 180. Immigrant Students’ Rights to Attend Public Schools - School Opening Alert 2017, IDRA 
NEWSL. (Intercultural Development Research Association, San Antonio, Tex.), August 2017, 
https://www.idra.org/resource-center/immigrant-students-rights-attend-public-schools 
-school-opening-alert-2017/. 
 181. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012). 
 182. See Undocumented Workers’ Employment Rights, LEGAL AID AT WORK, https:// 
legalaidatwork.org/factsheet/undocumented-workers-employment-rights/ (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2019). 
 183. Id. Some states offer medical insurance to undocumented people.  
Ruben Castaneda, Where Can Undocumented Immigrants Go for Health Care?, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 
2, 2016, 1:01 PM), https://health.usnews.com/wellness/articles/2016-11-02/where-can 
-undocumented-immigrants-go-for-health-care. Medical schools often provide free medical 
care to known undocumented immigrants. Undocumented immigrants are helped by state 
and federal housing laws that prohibit discrimination against them. See also Angela Hart, 
Rent Increases, Evictions Up in Immigrant Communities Under Trump, Housing Lawyers Say, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (July 10, 2017 12:01 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics 
-government/capitol-alert/article160239609.html. California’s recently adopted budget 
includes $45 million to assist undocumented people and has recently proposed a law to give 
undocumented people the right to sue their landlord for threatening to report them or 
actually reporting them to ICE. Amy Dobson, Calif. Lawmakers Approve Bill  
Protecting Undocumented Immigrant Tenants from Landlord Harassment, WASH. POST (Sep. 19, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/where-we-live/wp/2017/09/19/calif-
lawmakers-approve-bill-protecting-undocumented-immigrant-tenants-from-landlord 
-harassment; Jazmine Ulloa, Nearly $50 Million in the California State Budget Will Go to 
Expanded Legal Services for Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (Jun. 15, 2017, 6:38 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-nearly-50 
-million-in-the-california-1497576640-htmlstory.html. As of May 2017, some states allow 
undocumented immigrants to receive state driver licenses. Gilberto Mendoza, States  
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 Considering an extensive system of exceptions to the broadest 
interpretation of the harboring provision (merely “substantial 
facilitation”), the government will be hard pressed to provide a 
reason why accommodation for religiously motivated people and 
organizations cannot be made available. The government would 
likely lose under the least restrictive means test of RFRA. As Justice 
Kennedy said, “[T]he government has not made the second 
showing required by RFRA, that the means it uses to regulate is the 
least restrictive way to further its interest. . . . [T]he record in these 
cases shows that there is an existing, recognized, workable, and 
already-implemented framework to provide coverage.”184 
 When there is an “existing, recognized, workable and already-
implemented framework” for providing “substantial facilitation” 
to undocumented immigrants through public schools, hospitals, or 
in a host of other secular ways, the government’s denial of 
religiously motivated aid to undocumented immigrants is not 
likely to going to pass the least restrictive means test of RFRA.185 A 
court examining the least restrictive means test in this context 
would likely say, “[W]e therefore conclude that this system 
constitutes an alternative that achieves all of the Government’s 
aims while providing greater respect for religious liberty.”186 
Whether a religiously motivated claimant or defendant could 
succeed on a Free Exercise defense under the First Amendment is 
beyond the scope of this Article, but there does seem to be a strong 
possibility for success under the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Employment Division v. Smith.187 There, the Court articulated a 
“mechanism for individualized exceptions”188 which might be 
better described as an exceptions exception. The Smith Court sent 
shock waves through the community of Free Exercise scholars for 
its controversial decision, in which laws that are “valid and neutral 
 
Offering Driver’s Licenses to Immigrants, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (updated Nov.  
30, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/states-offering-driver-s-licenses-to 
-immigrants.aspx. 
 184. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 737–38 (2014). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 692. 
 187. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 188. Id. at 884 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. 2147, 2156 (1986)). 
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law[s] of general applicability” 189 are usually not granted religious 
accommodations. The Court said, however, that if the government 
is already making exceptions to a rule for secular conduct, it cannot 
escape strict scrutiny for denying an exception to the same rule for 
religiously motivated conduct.190 As Justice Scalia explained while 
writing for the majority, “[W]here the State has in place a system of 
individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to 
cases of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.”191 Given 
the number of exemptions already available to individuals for 
purely secular conduct such as public education, medical care, and 
labor laws to the broadest interpretation of the harboring provision, 
the government will likely face a strong Free Exercise defense, even 
under Smith. 
Under the narrowest interpretation of the harboring provision, 
the government has a stronger chance of showing it had no less 
restrictive means of achieving its interest, because under this 
interpretation, the government’s interest is in being able to find the 
undocumented person. Under this narrow interpretation, the 
religiously motivated claimant or defendant will be hard pressed 
to show that the government was systematically allowing for 
exceptions to concealing undocumented people from detection 
(and not merely providing substantial help in a non-clandestine 
manner as hospitals, labor laws, or schools do). Moreover, whether 
the churches or religiously motivated people could be successful in 
mounting a defense under RFRA for concealing undocumented 
people is beyond the scope of this Article since “concealing” 
undocumented people is clearly prohibited by the INA’s § 1324. 
This Article offers the modest point that to help clear up the 
ambiguity in the harboring provision of § 1324, the viability of a 
RFRA claim or defense for a large number of people should be 
influential in an overall interpretive rationale. 
 
 189. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455, 102 S. Ct. 1051, 1058, n.3 (1982)). 
 190. Id. at 884. 
 191. Id. 
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V. USING RFRA PROPHYLACTICALLY TO INTERPRET THE 
AMBIGUOUS PROVISION IS THE BEST WAY TO SOLVE THE PUZZLE 
A solution to this potential large-scale conflict between a broad 
interpretation of the INA’s harboring provision and RFRA is found 
in the text and spirit of RFRA itself. Since a large amount of religious 
people would be affected by the ambiguity that remains in the INA’s 
harboring provision despite the federal courts’ employment of 
traditional rules of interpretation, the ambiguity should be resolved 
by using RFRA to influence a narrow construction of the provision 
and thereby avert a wide-spread RFRA problem. Traditionally, 
RFRA is used on the back-end of a federal law to craft a judicial case-
by-case exception to an otherwise neutral and generally applicable 
law where that law substantially burdens a person’s exercise of 
religion (and where the government does not override that 
substantial burden with a compelling interest that is narrowly 
tailored).192 While RFRA has not generally been viewed as a tool to 
construe an ambiguous prior statute, there are some rare instances, 
such as the INA’s harboring provision, where such an application 
makes sense in order to fulfill RFRA’s mandate. 
This proposal may sound like the privileged doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance being applied with RFRA: if RFRA casts 
doubts on a statute’s ability to survive RFRA scrutiny, the RFRA 
question is avoided altogether by construing the statute narrowly. 
That is not an accurate understanding. Scholars have written 
persuasively about what kind of statute RFRA is—some calling it  
a “super-statute,”193 a precommitment statute,194 or even an 
unconstitutional statute.195 But the one thing everyone can agree on 
is that RFRA is not the Constitution and it does not carry the same 
 
 192.  Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 421 
(2006). (“The Government’s argument that the existence of a congressional exemption for 
peyote does not indicate that the Controlled Substances Act is amenable to judicially crafted 
exceptions fails because RFRA plainly contemplates court-recognized exceptions . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
 193. Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. 
Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249, 253 (1995). 
 194. Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Federal 
Law Without Violating the Constitution, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1903, 1920 (2001). 
 195. Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, Period, 
1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 19 (1998). 
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weight as the Constitution. RFRA is, after all, subject to the same 
rules of modification or repeal as other statutes.196 So I am not 
proposing that statutory interpreters create a doctrine of RFRA 
avoidance that should trump all other interpretive considerations 
solely to avoid a problem with RFRA. 
I am also not proposing that we harmonize the statutes. 
Whatever RFRA is—super-statute, pre-commitment statute, 
framework statute, foundational statute—just about everyone agrees 
it is not just like every other statute. Scholars who support and 
oppose RFRA have argued that RFRA “amends” all federal law.197 
RFRA by its own terms says that it applies “to all Federal law, and 
the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and 
whether adopted before or after [this enactment of this Act].”198 It 
states that all federal law is “subject” to it.199 RFRA is not on equal 
footing with other statutes. RFRA is on a higher level. 
Using RFRA to narrowly construe a prior ambiguous statute 
after traditional tools of interpretation have failed is more like using 
it as a later tool of interpretation, and less like an avoidance doctrine 
or a harmonization rule. I am not offering a comprehensive theory 
on how RFRA could be used as a tool of statutory construction. I 
am offering the much more modest point that, when a statute like 
the INA’s § 1324 harboring provision is irreducibly ambiguous, and 
one construction would lead to a viable RFRA claim or defense for 
a sweeping amount of religious people, and another construction 
likely does not, it is reasonable to use RFRA as a tool of construction 
(in certain circumstances). In the first instance, this use should 
happen with executive officials when they exercise their 
discretionary interpretive judgment. If executive officials fail to do 
this, as they did in United States v. Warren,200 then courts should use 
RFRA to narrowly construe § 1324’s harboring provision. 
 
 196. Even admirers of RFRA admit this. See Magarian, supra note 194, at 1928 & n.110. 
(“Federal RFRA is only a statute, and it occupies the same, inferior position to the 
Constitution that every other federal statute occupies.”). 
 197. See Paulsen, supra note 193, at 270; see also Hamilton, supra note 195, at 7–8. 
 198. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 199. Id. § 2000bb-3(b). 
 200. United States v. Warren, No. CR 18-002233-TUC-RCC(BPV), 2018 WL 5257807 (D. 
Ariz. May 31, 2018). 
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While one may agree with my proposal as applied to executive 
officials, one major objection to my proposal is that if judges use 
RFRA as a tool of construction for INA § 1324, the statute’s scope is 
narrowed beyond what RFRA requires, i.e., secular conduct is 
protected as well as religious conduct. Undoubtedly, Congress 
intended for RFRA to protect religiously motivated conduct “in all 
cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.”201 
This makes my method an imperfect solution because it is 
overinclusive in theory. But the alternative—using the traditional 
case-by-case exception method—is not the best solution in this 
situation because it will merely attempt to treat a rampant and an 
overwhelming amount of RFRA claims and defenses. If widespread 
injury to religious freedom can be prophylactically prevented by 
utilizing RFRA as a tool that narrowly construes § 1324 when the 
traditional tools have failed to interpret it, then this is the best use 
of RFRA, even if it is overinclusive in protecting secular conduct, as 
well. I discuss in further detail later why I think the over 
inclusiveness of my proposal is more of an asset than a liability.202 
Specifically, my argument for a RFRA-based statutory 
construction of INA § 1324 is as follows: (A) It follows a fortiori that 
since RFRA amends all federal law, RFRA should influence the 
interpretation of an irreducibly ambiguous, previously enacted 
statute. (B) This is consistent with RFRA’s statutory framework and 
the Constitution. (C) Using RFRA as a tool of construction for 
previously enacted statutes, like the harboring provision, is not a 
technique that should be invoked all of the time, but there are good 
reasons for invoking it here.  
The first of these reasons is that, because a large percentage of 
the conduct prosecuted under a broad interpretation of the 
harboring provision would be religiously motivated, the efficient 
administration of justice would be better served by considering 
RFRA to construe the statute narrowly. This method is easier for 
the courts to administer than case-by-case accommodations 
because it prevents an onslaught of cases from burdening the court 
system, which would likely require the courts to delve into the 
nature and sincerity of a claimant or defendant’s beliefs. The second 
 
 201. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012). 
 202. See supra Section IV.B. 
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reason is that this method prevents the burden of litigation to 
religiously motivated defendants. Third, another substantive canon 
of construction—the rule of lenity—counsels in favor of a narrow 
construction and courts are familiar with implementing it. While it 
is not within the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that my 
proposal also avoids the contention that arises from the more 
conventional case-by-case exemption approach where the tension 
is not necessary. While it is best if executive officials adopt this 
method of allowing RFRA to influence their statutory construction 
of an ambiguous statute, if they do not, then courts should (as 
shown by United States v. Warren203). 
A. It Follows A Fortiori that Since RFRA Amends All Federal Law, 
RFRA Should Influence the Construction of an 
Ambiguous, Previously Enacted Statute 
The applicability section of RFRA states in § 3(a): “IN 
GENERAL.— This chapter applies to all Federal law, and the 
implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and 
whether adopted before or after November 16, 1993.”204 
It is generally agreed that Congress intended RFRA to serve as 
an amendment to all federal law.205 “RFRA operates as a sweeping 
‘super-statute,’ cutting across all other federal statutes (now and 
future, unless specifically exempted) and modifying their reach.”206 
It follows a fortiori that if RFRA amends all federal law, including 
previously enacted statutes, that RFRA should at least influence the 
construction of an ambiguous prior statute after other traditional 
interpretive tools have failed. 
One objection to this logic is that of a general retrospective 
method of interpretation; it is the concern “for far reaching and 
unanticipated consequences”207—the same concern that was held 
 
 203. United States v. Warren, No. CR 18-002233-TUC-RCC(BPV), 2018 WL 5257807 (D. 
Ariz. May 31, 2018). 
 204. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) (2012). 
 205. See Paulsen, supra note 193, at 270; see also Hamilton, supra note 195, at 7–8. 
 206. See Paulsen, supra note 193, at 253. 
 207. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 2085, 2113 (2002) (quoting Federalism Accountability Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 1214 
Before the Senate S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 303 (1999) (statement of 
Randolph D. Moss, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Counsel)). 
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by the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, which 
considered the appropriate scope of the proposed Federalism 
Accountability Act, which would have had general retrospective 
(as well as prospective) application.208 The Senate Committee was 
concerned that, as applied to prior acts, “it would have unsettled 
vast areas of preemption doctrine, shrinking the already-judicially-
determined preemptive effect of countless federal statutes.”209 
Professor Rosenkranz explained: 
 The objection to retrospective interpretive statutes is that they 
amend the entire United States Code in one fell swoop. Congress 
of course has constitutional power to do so; indeed, Congress 
could repeal the entire United States Code with one sentence if it 
so chose. But mandating a new interpretive principle to gloss all 
previous acts of Congress may seem a particularly irresponsible 
way to amend the United States Code. Perhaps it is implausible 
that Congress could analyze thoroughly the sudden effects of 
such a statute. The potential for “far reaching and unanticipated 
consequences” is the heart of the objection to general retrospective 
interpretive statues.210 
Whether RFRA was a good idea as a matter of policy, however, 
is beyond the scope of this Article. Like it or not, RFRA is a 
retrospective interpretive statute. While this has traditionally been 
understood as commanding case-by-case exemptions to prior 
federal law that meets RFRA’s strict scrutiny test, my point is that 
it is not clear if that is the only way RFRA amends federal law. If a 
prior federal statute is notoriously ambiguous after the traditional 
interpretive tools have been used (as evidenced by the federal 
circuit split over the scope of § 1324), RFRA—as an “amendment” 
to § 1324—should influence the final construction of it. 
Another objection is that, since the INA predates RFRA, we do 
not know whether Congress would have exempted it from RFRA 
(whereas Congress can create a clear statement exception to RFRA 
in future statutes, which creates the implication that if Congress 
does not create such an exception, they did not want one).211 But 
 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 2113–14. 
 211. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(b) (2012) (requiring a clear statement to exempt future 
statutes from RFRA). 
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this objection proves too much. Since the INA was created before 
RFRA was enacted, if Congress meant to exempt it, or any part of 
it, from RFRA’s reach, it could have done so in RFRA itself. 
B. Using RFRA to Narrowly Construe § 1324 Is Consistent with 
RFRA’s Statutory Framework and the Constitution 
RFRA has not generally been viewed as a tool of construction. 
Instead, it has generally been viewed as requiring judicially crafted 
exceptions to general rules of applicability. RFRA’s text does not 
say that it is solely to be mobilized as judicially crafted exceptions. 
The Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purposes and the 
Applicability sections are particularly helpful in considering how 
to implement RFRA.212 They state: 
§ 2000bb. Congressional findings and declaration of purposes 
(a) Findings 
The Congress finds that— 
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free 
exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its 
protection in the First Amendment to the 
Constitution; 
(2) laws “neutral” toward religion may burden 
religious exercise as surely as laws intended to 
interfere with religious exercise; 
(3) governments should not substantially burden 
religious exercise without compelling justification; 
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the 
requirement that the government justify burdens on 
religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward 
religion; and 
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior 
Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking 
sensible balances between religious liberty and 
competing prior governmental interests. 
 
 212. See Id. § 2000bb. 
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(b) Purposes 
The purposes of this chapter are— 
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth 
in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to 
guarantee its application in all cases where free 
exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and 
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose 
religious exercise is substantially burdened by 
government. 213 
§ 2000bb-3. Applicability 
(a) In general 
This chapter applies to all Federal law, and the 
implementation of that law, whether statutory or 
otherwise, and whether adopted before or after 
November 16, 1993. 
(b) Rule of construction 
Federal statutory law adopted after November 16, 1993, 
is subject to this chapter unless such law explicitly 
excludes such application by reference to this chapter. 
(c) Religious belief unaffected 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize 
any government to burden any religious belief.214 
RFRA provides judicial relief for a person whose religious 
exercise has been substantially burdened by the government, 
stating they may exert either a claim or a defense under RFRA in 
court.215 Undoubtedly, RFRA provides an explicit private right of 
action. Whether a successful class action can be brought under 
RFRA is beyond the scope of this Article, but is being reasonably 
attempted.216 The fact that RFRA provides a private right of action, 
however, does not preclude implementing RFRA’s broader 
 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. § 2000bb-3. 
 215. Id. § 2000bb(b)(2); Id. § 2000bb-1(c). 
 216. See Teneng v. Trump, No. 5:18-cv-01609-JGB-KK (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 1, 2018). 
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mandate and purpose to “restore the compelling interest test . . . 
and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of 
religion is substantially burdened”217 in limited instances of 
statutory construction, especially where doing so would be both a 
prophylactic measure to prevent unnecessary widespread burdens 
on religious exercise and a prophylactic measure to prevent 
needless contention with non-religiously motivated conduct. 
Moreover, RFRA’s Applicability Section states that it applies to 
the implementation of all federal law, regardless of whether such 
law was adopted before or after the enactment of RFRA.218 
Executive officials have the authority to weigh RFRA’s mandate in 
implementing the law through their exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion. Whether rule-making agencies such as the Department 
of Homeland Security should allow RFRA to prophylactically 
influence their discretion is beyond the scope of this Article as this 
Article is limited to instances, like INA § 1324, where a pre-RFRA 
statute is irreducibly ambiguous, and courts must construe it to 
effectively “implement” the law. 
The second part of RFRA’s Applicability Section is the Rule of 
Construction: “federal statutory law adopted after [the date of this 
enactment of this Act] is subject to this Act unless such law 
explicitly excludes such application by reference to this chapter.”219 
Almost certainly this provision was created to dispel any doubt 
about where RFRA ranked on the hierarchy of subsequently 
enacted laws. It says that RFRA has the higher ground; subsequent 
laws are not to be harmonized with RFRA in traditional ways 
unless the subsequent law has a clear statement exception to RFRA. 
This prospective rule of construction has led to scholarly debate, 
most notably between Lawrence Tribe, Nicholas Rosenkranz, Larry 
Alexander, Saikrishna Prakash, and others, about the propriety and 
constitutionality of Congress imposing mandatory prospective 
rules of statutory interpretation.220 Imposing “constraints upon, or 
 
 217. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012). 
 218. Id. § 2000bb-3(a). 
 219. Id. § 2000bb-3(b). 
 220. See Rosenkranz, supra note 207, at 2113-14. But see Larry Alexander & Saikrishna 
Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 
CONST. COMMENT. 97 (2003). 
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tak[ing] presumptive priority over, downstream legislative 
decision making” is subject to special concerns that are not 
applicable to using RFRA as a retrospective rule of construction for 
statutes like the INA and is beyond the scope of this Article.221 
What matters for purposes of resolving the ambiguity in the 
INA’s harboring provision is whether it is constitutional for RFRA 
to be used as a retrospective method of statutory interpretation 
(assuming that it is within the statutory framework of RFRA itself 
as discussed previously). As Professor Rosenkranz notes, there is 
nothing in the Constitution that prevents Congress from creating a 
retrospective method of statutory interpretation, in general.222 
Examining whether this specific retrospective method is 
constitutional is best accomplished by, as Rosenkranz instructs, 
asking what former method is being displaced by the proposed 
method and whether that former method is constitutionally 
required.223 In this case, using RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard as a 
method of interpretation displaces the standard set out in 
Employment Division v. Smith, that laws which are neutral and 
generally applicable are not required to meet strict scrutiny under 
the Free Exercise Clause.224 Congress intended RFRA to be a 
“powerful tool . . . shift[ing] an animating policy of federal law 
without picking through the United States Code section by 
section.”225 This shift in policy was to ratchet up the standard of 
what is required by the Free Exercise Clause. When the strict 
scrutiny standard is applied on a retail level, the court balances 
various competing interests, including constitutional ones. When 
RFRA’s strict scrutiny mandate is applied wholesale—as a method 
of statutory construction to resolve ambiguity in a statute—this 
ratcheted-up free exercise standard must not upset the usual 
balance with the Establishment Clause.226 
An analysis of whether using RFRA as a retrospective method 
of statutory construction is constitutional is a substantive question 
 
 221. Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 
YALE L.J. 400, 421 (2015). 
 222. Rosenkranz, supra note 207. 
 223. See id. at 2087. 
 224. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). 
 225. See Rosenkranz, supra note 207, at 2114. 
 226. See generally id. 
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that should be resolved by weighing Establishment Clause 
concerns on a statute specific basis. Courts should weigh 
Establishment Clause considerations because using RFRA’s 
mandate as an interpretive method wholesale may 
“unconstitutionally privilege[] religious interests at the expense of 
secular interests”227 in a way that does not usually happen when 
RFRA is used to craft a limited exception. In this instance, however, 
using RFRA to resolve the ambiguity in the INA’s harboring 
provision would not upset the usual Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clause balance because it leads to a narrower 
construction of the criminal provision for not only religiously 
motivated conduct but purely secular conduct as well. This is, even 
many RFRA skeptics would likely agree, a constitutional use of 
RFRA. As one scholar puts it, the RFRA protection in this instance 
would not “improperly privilege religion, because [it] would [not] 
inequitably relieve believers of constraints from which many 
nonbelievers might also prefer to be free.”228 
C. There Are Good Reasons for Using RFRA as a Tool of Construction 
for Specific Prior Ambiguous Statutes, like the Harboring Provision  
Allowing RFRA to influence the construction of prior statutes 
when traditional tools have failed is a technique that should not be 
invoked all the time. As the Article discusses more fully in Part V, 
it should be invoked in certain narrow circumstances. There are, 
however, good reasons for invoking it here. First, it is easier for the 
courts to administer than case-by-case accommodations because it 
prevents an onslaught of cases from burdening the administration 
of the courts—something that would likely lead to inappropriate 
judicial scrutiny of religious beliefs. Second, it prevents the burden 
of litigation to religiously motivated defendants. Third, the rule of 
lenity advises it. Lastly, it avoids the needless contention that some 
scholars argue arises from the more conventional case-by-case 
approach, which sometimes privileges religious conduct over 
secular conduct. 
 
 227. Magarian, supra note 194, at 1970. 
 228. Id. at 1977. 
003.INKS_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/19  3:35 AM 
107 Looming RFRA Problem Can Be Solved by RFRA 
 157 
1. A RFRA-based construction of the harboring provision prevents both 
the onslaught of cases from burdening the courts and the needless 
judicial scrutiny of religious beliefs 
Mobilizing RFRA’s mandate prophylactically to construe 
narrowly the ambiguous harboring provision is easier for the 
court to administer than case-by-case accommodations because a 
narrow construction prevents an onslaught of accommodation 
cases from burdening the court system. If the Trump 
administration creates another “zero tolerance” policy229 and 
strictly and narrowly enforces § 1324 as it is doing in United States 
v. Warren,230 there will be widespread RFRA defenses and 
probably widespread RFRA claims. There might even be a RFRA 
class-action. This sweeping mobilization of RFRA in response to a 
narrow construction of a federal criminal law will cause the court 
to delve into the nature and sincerity of a claimant or defendant’s 
beliefs to discern which qualify.231 
Few other instances in the U.S. Code make what is generally 
understood as charitable conduct (i.e. “substantially facilitating” an 
undocumented person’s stay regardless of intent to hide them from 
authorities) a criminal offense. Not only is this unusual in and of 
itself, but the large presence of unauthorized aliens in the United 
States makes it extraordinarily difficult for charitable people to 
avoid violating a broad interpretation of § 1324, even if they are not 
providing open sanctuary. A broad spectrum of conduct falls under 
the standard of “substantial facilitation” of an undocumented 
person. Defendants who have been charged with “harboring” 
under this broad interpretation of the statute may raise a RFRA 
defense, whether they are motivated by a mainstream religious 
belief, an obscure religious belief, something that looks like 
religious belief, some other deeply held conscientious objection, or 
 
 229. Trump’s “zero tolerance” policy has already strained the federal court system, 
leading to mass trials. See Russell Berman, 85 Immigrants Sentenced Together Before One Judge, 
THE ATLANTIC (June 19, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06 
/zero-tolerance-inside-a-south-texas-courtroom/563135/. 
 230. United States v. Warren, No. CR 18-002233-TUC-RCC(BPV), 2018 WL 5257807 (D. 
Ariz. May 31, 2018). 
 231.  For a full discussion on the complexity surrounding the court’s examination of 
the nature and sincerity of religious belief in religious freedom cases, see Nathan S. 
Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1185 (2017). 
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a philosophical belief based on generally accepted understandings 
of the Golden Rule.232 Given that RFRA was amended to even more 
broadly cover religious exercise than it initially did233 and given the 
wide-ranging amount of people charitably helping undocumented 
immigrants, it is not hard to foresee widespread RFRA defenses, or 
a RFRA class-action being raised to a narrow (“merely substantial 
facilitation”) interpretation of § 1324, should executive officials 
strictly enforce § 1324’s prohibition against those who harbor, as 
prosecutors are doing right now in United States v. Warren.234 
2. Using a RFRA-based construction of the harboring provision prevents 
the burden of litigation to religiously motivated defendants 
Similarly, mobilizing RFRA to construe an ambiguous statute 
with strong RFRA implications like the harboring provision 
prevents unnecessary criminal prosecution from burdening 
religiously motivated people. It hardly needs stating that 
undergoing prosecution for a federal crime is burdensome. Not 
only is there the potential loss of liberty and extensive legal costs, 
but the stigma associated with being criminally prosecuted can last 
a lifetime. Congress and the courts have recognized the burden that 
even the threat of litigation can place on Free Exercise. The text of 
RFRA also acknowledges this and provides that RFRA can be not 
only a defense, but a “claim . . . to persons whose religious exercise 
is substantially burdened by government.”235 In providing for a 
RFRA claim, Congress gave religiously motivated people not just a 
shield from prosecution, but also a sword to stop a potential threat 
of prosecution from having a chilling effect on their religious 
exercise. If the harboring provision is interpreted broadly, with the 
expectation that RFRA accommodations will be made on the back 
-end of the statute on a case-by-case basis during litigation, the 
potential chilling effect could be wide-ranging on religious 
exercise, given the number and diversity of religiously motivated 
people who are, or want to be, aiding undocumented people. 
 
 232. Denial of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts 2 and 3 at 2, Warren, 2018  
WL 5257807. 
 233. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012). 
 234. United States v. Warren, No. CR 18-002233-TUC-RCC(BPV), 2018 WL 5257807 (D. 
Ariz. May 31, 2018). 
 235. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012) (emphasis added). 
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Preventing religious people from being burdened with the 
widespread threat of prosecution is consistent with the text of 
RFRA, which provides broad and robust coverage for religious 
exercise. It is arguably more consistent with the spirit of RFRA to 
avert this chilling of religious exercise where the litigation burden 
is unnecessary and can be avoided prophylactically. 
3. The rule of lenity advises answering the interpretive question in 
§ 1324 consistently with a RFRA-based construction and judges are 
familiar with implementing it 
“One of the most fundamental principles of the criminal law is 
that it should punish culpable conduct—bad acts by persons with 
culpable mental states. One significant reason for this principle is 
obvious: The criminal law exists to maintain order through 
predictable schemes of punishment . . . .”236 The rule of lenity is a 
substantive canon of interpretation that, as a matter of policy, 
addresses this concern regarding criminal culpability. As one 
scholar succinctly put it, the rule of lenity “requires that ambiguity 
in criminal statutes be resolved in favor of the defendant.”237 
While a fulsome analysis of applying the rule of lenity’s 
interpretive framework is beyond the scope of this Article, it is 
important to realize this “ancient principle [that] direct[s] judges to 
construe ambiguous criminal statutes narrowly,”238 and advises 
answering the interpretive question posed in § 1324’s harboring 
provision in a way consistent with RFRA and in a way which 
judges are already familiar with implementing. Like the RFRA-
based construction this Article proposes, the rule of lenity is not the 
highest priority rule in statutory interpretation. “Judges who 
consider the framework may ultimately reject the rule in favor of a 
higher-priority canon, a claim of statutory clarity reached through 
reading the text and applying other interpretive tools, or a 
competing constitutional concern.”239 When, exactly, in the 
interpretive process RFRA should influence judges is beyond the 
 
 236. Mary L. Dohrmann, Hemming in “Harboring”: The Limits of Liability Under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324 and State Harboring Statutes, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1217, 1237 (2015). 
 237. Id. at 1239. 
 238. Intisar A. Rabb, Response, The Appellate Rule of Lenity, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 179, 
180 (2018). 
 239. Id. at 182. 
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scope of this Article. This Article’s modest point is that while RFRA 
should not be the highest priority tool in interpretation, it can and 
should be a part of the interpretive rationale when the higher 
priority tools are not working to provide clarity. 
VI. HOW A RFRA-BASED STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
HARBORING PROVISION IS REACHED 
A. The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Using the RFRA-Based 
Statutory Construction of the Harboring Provision 
This Article explained in Part IV why RFRA should be used to 
construct the ambiguous harboring provision, as opposed to creating 
case-by-case exemptions. This section seeks to explain when and 
how a RFRA-based statutory construction of a federal provision such 
as the harboring provision should be invoked. My proposal is as 
follows: (1) if the federal statute remains ambiguous after employing 
standard rules of interpretation and (2) after scrutinizing each 
interpretation of the ambiguous statute under RFRA’s strict scrutiny 
test, one interpretation of the ambiguous statute creates a viable 
RFRA claim or defense, and (3) there are prudential reasons for 
mobilizing RFRA on a macro scale instead of case-by-case 
exemptions, such as because a large amount of religiously motivated 
people would be implicated and (4) the usual balance with the 
Establishment Clause is not upset by mobilizing RFRA this way, 
then (5) invoke a RFRA-based statutory construction of the statute so 
as to avert a large scale RFRA problem. 
As already discussed in Part II, the INA’s § 1324 remains 
irreducibly ambiguous even after applying traditional rules of 
interpretation. As Part III discussed, the broadest interpretation of 
the harboring provision (“substantial facilitation”) creates a viable 
RFRA claim or defense. As Part IV discussed, this broad 
interpretation will implicate the conduct of a large amount of 
religiously motivated people, which will burden the courts. Because 
of this, it is better to employ RFRA as a tool of statutory construction 
than to use it on a case-by-case exemption basis. When the RFRA 
-based statutory construction of the harboring provision is complete, 
a narrow interpretation of the harboring provision (“substantial 
facilitation” plus concealment) results (which would apply to both 
religiously and non-religiously motivated people alike). 
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B. RFRA Should Influence the Statutory Interpretation of the Harboring 
Provision First at the Prosecutorial Stage and the Courts, if Necessary 
Until this point in the Article, the discussion has centered on 
RFRA influencing the court’s construction of an ambiguous statute. 
The interpretation, however, should first be influenced at the 
prosecutorial discretion stage for two primary reasons. First, as a 
general matter, prosecutors have long exercised discretion in 
initiating a charge under federal law (resulting in a “case or 
controversy” starting) and that discretion generally considers 
viable defenses that would undermine the ability for a prosecutor 
to prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, the Justice 
Manual specifically details that religious liberty concerns should 
inform litigation strategy. 
1. Prosecutors have discretion in initiating a charge under federal law 
and consider viable defenses that would undermine the case 
The Justice Manual describes the general discretion prosecutors 
exercise when initiating a charge: 
 Under the federal criminal justice system, the prosecutor has 
wide latitude in determining when, whom, how, and even 
whether to prosecute for apparent violations of federal criminal 
law. The prosecutor’s broad discretion in such areas as initiating 
or foregoing prosecutions, selecting or recommending specific 
charges, and terminating prosecutions by accepting guilty pleas 
has been recognized on numerous occasions by the courts. See, 
e.g., United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 762 (1997); Oyler v. Boles, 
368 U.S. 448 (1962); United States v. Fokker Services B.V., 818 F.3d 
733, 741 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 
(D.C. Cir. 1967); Powell v. Ratzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
This discretion exists by virtue of the prosecutor’s status as a 
member of the Executive Branch, and the President’s 
responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that the laws of 
the United States be “faithfully executed.” U.S. Const. Art. II § 3. 
See Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 n. 18 (D.C. Cir. 1974).240 
 
 240. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-27.110 (2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/jm/justice-manual. 
 
003.INKS_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/19  3:35 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
162 
This broad discretion includes whether to initiate a charge 
where a viable defense (such as RFRA) would make it very difficult 
for the prosecution to prove the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.241  
Moreover, both as a matter of fundamental fairness and in the 
interest of the efficient administration of justice, no prosecution 
should be initiated against any person unless the attorney for the 
government believes that the admissible evidence is sufficient to 
obtain and sustain a guilty verdict by an unbiased trier of fact.242 
2. The Justice Manual specifies that religious liberty concerns should 
inform litigation strategy 
More specifically regarding the broad first interpretation of the 
harboring provision, the Justice Manual states that “to the greatest 
extent practicable and permitted by law, Department components 
and United States Attorneys’ Offices must reasonably 
accommodate religious observance and practice in all activities, 
including litigation.”243 The manual itself goes on to articulate the 
strict scrutiny that RFRA requires: 
 RFRA prohibits the federal government from substantially 
burdening a person’s exercise of religion, unless the federal 
government demonstrates that application of such burden to the 
religious adherent is the least restrictive means of achieving a 
compelling governmental interest. RFRA applies to all actions by 
federal administrative agencies, including rulemaking, 
adjudication or other enforcement actions, and grant or contract 
distribution and administration.244 
This section of the manual further details the various ways 
religious freedom under RFRA are to be accommodated. It also 
provides for a point person to coordinate religious liberty issues in 
litigation: “Each litigating division should select a member of its 
 
 241. See the Justice Manual guidance stating, “The attorney for the government should 
commence or recommend federal prosecution if he/she believes that the person’s conduct 
constitutes a federal offense, and that the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to 
obtain and sustain a conviction . . . .” Id. § 9-27.220. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. § 1-15.100. 
 244. Id. § 1-15.300. 
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front office and each United States Attorney’s Office should assign 
its Civil Chief, or his/her designee, to coordinate religious liberty 
litigation issues and to implement this section.”245 Given this 
guidance in the Justice Manual regarding the paramountcy of 
religious liberty in informing litigation strategy generally, it follows 
that prosecutors should use RFRA when exercising their judgment 
in how broadly to construe the INA’s harboring provision. The 
Attorney General noted this in his guidance memorandum on 
interpreting religious liberty protections in federal law: 
 Much like administrative agencies engaged in rulemaking, 
agencies considering potential enforcement actions should 
consider whether such actions are consistent with federal 
protections for religious liberty. In particular, agencies should 
remember that RFRA applies to agency enforcement just as it 
applies to every other governmental action. An agency should 
consider RFRA when setting agency-wide enforcement rules and 
priorities, as well as when making decisions to pursue or continue 
any particular enforcement action . . . .246 
Moreover, the DOJ made it plain in the memo that religious 
liberty was to be respected at every level of the government’s 
litigation strategy, including prosecutorial discretion.247 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Trump administration’s “zero tolerance” policy towards 
undocumented people has resulted in religiously motivated 
resistance movements proliferating. Since President Trump has 
been in office, the sanctuary movement alone has more than 
doubled. Such religiously motivated resistance, however, has not 
slowed the administration’s aggressive agenda to “take the 
shackles off” ICE.248 In what has the potential to be a vicious cycle, 
the more the administration cracks down on undocumented 
people, the more the religiously motivated movement grows. And 
the more the movement grows, the more the administration may 
feel the need to crack down on the undocumented people. 
 
 245. Id. § 1-15.200. 
 246. Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Jeff Sessions, supra note 3, at 8. 
 247. See generally id. 
 248. Miroff & Sacchetti, supra note 30. 
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The state of the law regarding religiously motivated aid to 
undocumented people, however, is unclear. Although recent years 
have brought some clarity to a few circuits, federal courts remain 
divided about how broadly to interpret the INA’s provision against 
harboring undocumented people, even after employing the 
standard tools of interpretation. In at least two circuits,249 the courts 
interpreted the harboring provision to mean merely “substantially 
facilitating” (or “to make easier or less difficult”) an undocumented 
person’s stay in the United States. In at least three circuits,250 the 
courts decided that harboring involves more than mere substantial 
facilitation. These circuits require a specific intent to hide the 
undocumented person from authorities, although not necessarily 
in a clandestine manner. Lastly, in at least one circuit,251 the court 
interpreted the harboring provision to mean more than 
substantially facilitating, but not necessarily active hiding from 
authorities. This view, as articulated by the Seventh Circuit, is that 
harboring is conduct that substantially facilitates and that provides 
a person “a place to stay in which the authorities are unlikely to be 
seeking him.”252 
It is not difficult to foresee a conflict between the ambiguous 
harboring provision and a spectrum of religiously motivated 
conduct toward undocumented people. As the first version of this 
Article was being completed, Professor Scott Daniel Warren was 
being indicted under § 1324 for “taking care” of two undocumented 
men with food, water, and shelter because his religious beliefs 
compelled him to help human beings in distress.253 The last time the 
American legal system endured this significant of a clash between 
a president’s immigration policies and religiously motivated 
conduct towards undocumented people was in the 1980s. It was 
resolved in a different religious liberty paradigm—pre-RFRA,  
pre–O Centro, and pre–Hobby Lobby. Analysis under the new 
religious liberty paradigm reveals a strong RFRA claim or defense 
 
 249. See supra Section II.A (specifically, the Eighth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits). 
 250. See supra Section II.B (specifically, the Second, Sixth, Third, and Eleventh Circuits). 
 251. See supra Section II.C (the Seventh Circuit). 
 252. United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1050 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 253.  United States v. Warren, No. CR 18-002233-TUC-RCC(BPV), 2018 WL 5257807 (D. 
Ariz. May 31, 2018). 
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to a broad interpretation of the harboring statute as conduct that 
merely “substantially facilitates.” 
A solution to this looming conflict between a broad 
interpretation of the INA’s harboring provision and RFRA is for 
RFRA to influence the statutory construction of the INA’s 
harboring provision. Using RFRA as a tool of statutory construction 
is consistent with the text of RFRA and is constitutionally permitted 
in this instance. It may not be a technique that should be invoked 
all the time, but there are good reasons for invoking it here over 
RFRA’s traditional mechanism of case-by-case exemptions. First, it 
is easier for the courts to administer than case-by-case 
accommodations because it prevents an onslaught of litigation 
from burdening the court system, which would likely require them 
to delve into the nature of a defendant or claimant’s beliefs. Second, 
it prevents the burden of litigation to religiously motivated 
defendants. Third, another substantive canon of construction—the 
rule of lenity—counsels in favor of a narrow construction and 
courts are familiar with implementing it. Last, it avoids the 
contention that arises from the more conventional case-by-case 
exemption approach where the clash is not truly necessary. 
The puzzle of how to resolve the interaction of RFRA and the 
INA highlights a useful starting point for considering a range of 
different legal tools available to both executive officials and courts 
for operationalizing RFRA’s mandate and its interaction with other 
federal statutes. The modest point of this Article is to show that (1) 
if a federal statute remains ambiguous after employing traditional 
rules of interpretation and (2) after scrutinizing each possible 
interpretation of the ambiguous statute under RFRA’s strict 
scrutiny test, one interpretation of the ambiguous statute creates a 
viable RFRA claim or defense, and (3) there are prudential reasons 
for mobilizing RFRA on a macro scale than case-by-case 
exemptions, such as because a large amount of religiously 
motivated people would be implicated and (4) the usual balance 
with the Establishment Clause is not upset by mobilizing RFRA this 
way, then (5) it behooves executive officials and courts, if necessary, 
to invoke a RFRA-based statutory construction of the statute to 
solve the RFRA problem. 
 
  
